Firm Complexity and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift by Barinov, Alexander et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Firm Complexity and
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift
Alexander Barinov and Shawn Saeyeul Park and Celim
Yildizhan
University of California, Riverside, Terry College of Business,
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business, University of
Georgia
28 April 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71015/
MPRA Paper No. 71015, posted 29 April 2016 13:24 UTC
  
 
 
Firm Complexity and Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
 
 
 
Alexander Barinov        Shawn Saeyeul Park 
School of Business Administration          School of Business 
University of California, Riverside           Yonsei University 
 
 
 
Çelim Yıldızhan 
Terry College of Business 
University of Georgia 
 
 
April 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors wish to thank Deniz Anginer, Linda Bamber, Jie He, Andrea J. Heuson (discussant), David 
Hirshleifer, Sara Holland, Karel Hrazdil (discussant),  John Eric Hund, Guy Kaplanski (discussant), 
Frank Li (discussant), Stan Markov (discussant), Harold Mulherin, Bradley Paye and seminar participants 
at the University of Georgia, University of California at Riverside, the 2015 Southeast Region Annual 
Meeting of the American Accounting Association, the 2015 Northern Finance Association Annual 
Conference, the 2014 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, the 2014 Southern Finance 
Association Annual Meeting, the 2014 World Finance Conference and the 2014 Financial Management 
Association European Conference for helpful discussion and guidance. 
1 
 
 
Firm Complexity and Post Earnings Announcement Drift  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We show that the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is stronger for 
conglomerates than single-segment firms. Conglomerates, on average, are larger than 
single segment firms, so it is unlikely that limits-to-arbitrage drive the difference in 
PEAD. Rather, we hypothesize that market participants find it more costly and 
difficult to understand firm-specific earnings information regarding conglomerates 
which slows information processing about them. In support of our hypothesis, we find 
that, compared to single-segment firms with similar firm-characteristics, 
conglomerates have lower institutional ownership, lower short interest, are covered 
by fewer analysts, these analysts have less industry expertise and also make larger 
forecast errors.   Finally, we find that an increase in firm complexity leads to larger 
PEAD and document that more complicated conglomerates have greater post-
earnings announcement drifts. Our results are robust to a long list of alternative 
explanations of PEAD as well as alternative measures of firm complexity. 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: G11, G12, G14, G32, G33, M4, L14, D82 
Keywords: post-earnings-announcement-drift, conglomerates, complicated firms, business 
complexity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we examine the relation between business complexity (organizational form) and 
price formation, by contrasting equity return reactions around earnings announcements for 
conglomerates and single-segment firms.  We attempt to answer the following three main questions: 
(i) Is it more difficult to understand firm-specific earnings information regarding conglomerates, (ii) 
if so, what are the channels through which conglomeration increases earnings-related informational 
frictions, and (iii) how business complexity (organizational structure) differs from other proxies of 
firm-complexity, in particular from those relating to disclosure complexity.  In doing so, it is not 
our purpose to pinpoint whether business complexity leads to mispricing because it introduces 
informational frictions or because investors’ limited-attention prevents them from fully 
incorporating the information contained in disaggregated financial statements into prices.  Rather, 
we believe the answer is a combination of the two and that both of these hypotheses ultimately are 
tied to the question of whether business complexity impedes information processing about the firm.  
First, using organizational structure as our proxy for business complexity, we find that firms 
with more complicated organizational structures (conglomerates) have larger post-earnings 
announcement drifts compared to simpler firms (single-segment firms).  Specifically, we find that 
conglomerates have post-earnings announcement drifts (PEAD’s) that are twice as large as single-
segment firms.  Our findings are not explained by traditional limits-to-arbitrage arguments (Bartov, 
Radhakrishnan and Krinsky 2000; Mendenhall 2004; Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi 2008; Sadka 2006) as 
conglomerates on average are significantly larger than single-segment firms.  Rather, we attribute 
our findings to the fact that it is more costly and difficult to understand firm-specific earnings 
information regarding complicated firms and that information processing takes more time for 
complex firms, leading conglomerates to underreact to earnings surprises significantly more than 
single-segment firms.  In line with this argument, we show that sophisticated market participants 
including analysts, institutional investors and short-sellers find it more difficult to understand 
conglomerates with respect to single-segment firms.  We document that, compared to single-
segment firms with similar firm-characteristics, conglomerates have lower institutional ownership, 
lower short interest, are covered by fewer analysts, these analysts have less industry expertise and 
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they also make larger forecast errors.  Our results would support the limited attention hypothesis of 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)
1,2
.   
Second, we investigate the reason for the larger PEAD for conglomerates. The larger drift for 
conglomerates could be attributable to either (i) more news released per unit of unexpected surprise 
earnings (SUE) for conglomerates than single-segment firms or to (ii) under-reaction by investors to 
conglomerates.  In an effort to understand the source of the difference in PEAD, we contrast the 
immediate as well as the delayed responses of single-segment firms and conglomerates for a hedge 
portfolio that is long the largest unexpected surprise earnings (SUE) decile and short the smallest 
SUE decile.  Our analysis indicates that single-segment firms and conglomerates have similar hedge 
returns in the three days around earnings announcements.  This finding makes it unlikely that there 
is more news released by conglomerates with respect to single-segment firms for the same level of 
earnings surprise.  Instead, our analysis suggests that conglomerates under-react to earnings 
announcements when compared to single-segment firms.  Following Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), 
we define delayed response ratio as the share of the total stock response to announcements that 
occurs with delay.  We find that the delayed response ratio for conglomerates is 42.4%, which is 
11.4% more than it is for single-segment firms’ 31%.  Our analysis lends further support to the 
interpretation that investors have more difficulty processing earnings related information regarding 
conglomerates and that information processing takes more time for complex firms.  The same 
results can also be interpreted as evidence of the limited attention paid to more complicated firms 
by investors.   
Third, in an effort to understand if investors really have difficulty interpreting information 
related to more complicated firms we focus on periods during which firm complexity increases. If 
the level of firm complexity (conglomerate status) is related to a certain unknown variable that also 
drives PEAD, then new conglomerates would likely have little exposure to this variable and one 
                                                 
1
 Our results could also be interpreted to be in line with Merton’s (1987) hypothesis about information costs as well as 
Hong and Stein’s (1999) arguments about trend-chasers versus news-watchers.   
 
2
 Although it is not our focus, we also find that conglomerates have lower segment disclosure quality than single 
segment firms introducing additional frictions in the processing of firm level information regarding conglomerates 
compared to single-segment firms. We proxy for segment disclosure quality using the segment reporting index first 
proposed by Franco, Urcan and Vasvari (2015). Segment reporting index (rindex) is measured as the firm’s average 
industry-adjusted (at 2-digit SIC code levels) percentage of segment items reported at the end of the fiscal year. For a 
single-segment firm segment disclosure quality is calculated simply as the percentage of company financial items 
reported at the end of the fiscal year. 
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would expect new conglomerates to have low levels of PEAD. Under our hypothesis, however, 
investors should have the greatest confusion when interpreting earnings announcements of new 
conglomerates, due to the significant and recent change to their complexity level.  We find that an 
increase in firm complexity, defined either as an increase in the number of segments or as the 
change in the conglomerate status, leads to higher PEAD.  In particular, we find that PEAD for new 
conglomerates is double that of existing conglomerates and more than four times that of single-
segment firms.  Furthermore, we find that the stronger average PEAD for firms that have recently 
become conglomerates, or have added new business segments, is attributable primarily to firms that 
have created a new line of business from within, without merging with another firm from a different 
industry. 
Finally, we investigate whether the degree of complexity matters in the cross-section of 
conglomerate PEAD returns.  In doing so we utilize the dispersion in segment earnings growth 
rates, HTSD
3
, as our proxy for firm complexity. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) propose that as long as 
a sub-section of investors use the firm’s aggregate earnings growth rate, instead of individual 
segment growth rates, to extrapolate the future value of the firm the firm will be mispriced.  They 
suggest and theoretically show that higher dispersion in segment earnings growth rates with respect 
to the firm’s aggregate growth rate will lead to higher information processing costs, which will limit 
investor attention and eventually lead to higher mispricing for the firm.  Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003) interpret HTSD as a measure of investor inattention.  We find, in line with theory, that 
conglomerates with high dispersion in their segments’ growth rates have larger post-earnings 
announcement drifts.  This finding suggests that higher degree of complexity among conglomerates 
leads to higher level of PEAD and further supports the notion that higher business complexity limits 
investors’ attention by reducing their ability to interpret publicly available but hard-to-process 
information.          
Our results are robust to alternative explanations of PEAD such as potential spillover from the 
predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012), the impact of analyst responsiveness (Zhang 
                                                 
3
 HTSD, Hirshleifer-Teoh Segment earnings growth Dispersion measure, is a proxy for limited attention proposed by 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). In order to calculate HTSD, first we compute the deviation of each segment’s earnings 
growth rate from the firm’s aggregate earnings growth rate and square it. Then, we value weight all segment deviation 
squared values by the amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales of the firm.  Finally, we 
add up all the squared segment deviation values weighed by corresponding sales share values to calculate HTSD.     
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2008), the impact of ex-ante earnings volatility on earnings persistence (Cao and Narayanamoorthy 
2012), the time-varying nature of earnings persistence (Chen 2013), as well as the impact of 
disclosure complexity (Miller 2010, You and Zhang 2009, Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal 
2010, Lehavy, Li and Merkley 2011, Lee 2012)
4
.  Furthermore, we find no evidence that 
conglomerates are more likely to choose Fridays (Dellavigna and Pollet 2009) or days with more 
competing news (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh 2009) to announce their earnings. 
Our study contributes to three strands of literature.  First, we add to the literature on the 
determinants of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD).  We show that business complexity 
induces significant informational frictions that make it more difficult to understand earnings related 
information regarding complex firms.  This, in turn limits investor attention leading to larger 
PEAD.  Specifically, we find that conglomerates have post-earnings announcement drifts that are 
twice as large as single-segment firms and that conglomerates’ delayed response ratio is 11.4% 
higher than that of single-segment firms.  Second, we complement the literature that studies how 
business complexity can complicate information processing for sophisticated market participants.  
Specifically, we document that, compared to single-segment firms with similar firm-characteristics, 
conglomerates have lower institutional ownership, lower short interest, are covered by fewer 
analysts, these analysts have less industry expertise and they also make larger forecast errors.  
Third, we expand on the literature that studies firm complexity by showing that the impact of 
business complexity on PEAD is a distinct phenomenon from the one documented in Cohen and 
Lou (2012) as well as being robust to alternative explanations of PEAD.  The findings should be of 
interest to researchers, analysts and investors interested in the impact of business complexity on 
market efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents hypothesis development.  
Section 3 describes our measure of business complexity and other data utilized in this study, and 
provides descriptive statistics.  Section 4 provides our main results.  Section 5 provides a 
comprehensive list of robustness tests.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 We investigate whether alternative explanations of PEAD, which could be tied to other dimensions of firm-
complexity, can explain our results explicitly in Tables 7 and 8. 
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2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior research has demonstrated the role that corporate focus (conglomeration) can play in 
improving (deteriorating) a firm’s information environment. The literature has shown that focus-
increasing spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and targeted stock offerings lead to a significant increase in 
coverage by analysts that specialize in subsidiary firms’ industries as well as an improvement in 
analyst forecast accuracy for parent and subsidiary firms.   
Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) attribute the improvement in analyst forecast accuracy in 
part to increased disclosure as all analysts gain access to disaggregated data for the parent and 
subsidiary firms after the breakup.  Furthermore, they find that there is significant incremental 
improvement in forecast accuracy for specialists relative to non-specialists suggesting that focus-
increasing restructurings may reduce analysts’ task complexity (Clement 1999) and may also lead 
to better facilitation of information transfers by analysts with industry expertise (Hilary and Shen 
2013).  In a related paper, Chemmanur and Liu (2011) theoretically show that focus-increasing 
restructurings lead to higher information production by institutional investors.  They attribute the 
increase in information production to two reasons. First, division of consolidated firms into less 
complex units with their own financial reports reduces outside investors' information production 
costs. Second, focus-increasing restructurings allow institutional investors to concentrate their 
investment in those parts of the conglomerate about which they have expertise.     
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest that even if disaggregation can improve information 
processing about complicated firms, better disclosure will not necessarily fully eliminate the 
mispricing of complicated firms.  More specifically, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) theoretically show 
that as long as a non-negligible percentage of the investing public uses firm-level earnings growth 
rates rather than utilizing individual segment earnings growth rates to project the future value of 
conglomerates, more complicated firms will face larger mispricing.  In a related paper, Cohen and 
Lou (2012) find that conglomerates take longer to incorporate industrywide shocks into their prices 
compared to single-segment firms.  In particular, Cohen and Lou find that pseudo-conglomerate 
returns predict the returns to actual conglomerates one month ahead, which indicates that 
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conglomerates take an extra month to incorporate industrywide shocks into their prices
5
.  Results in 
Cohen and Lou (2012) could be attributable either to the fact that conglomeration introduces 
additional frictions to information processing or simply to the limited-attention hypothesis proposed 
by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), or a combination of the two
6
.     
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical research on the relation between business 
complexity (organizational structure) and the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD).  The 
closest studies focus on the relation between PEAD and alternative measures of firm-complexity 
especially those related to disclosure complexity.  Miller (2010) shows that disclosure complexity 
reduces trading volume, especially among retail investors.  You and Zhang (2009) find that higher 
disclosure complexity, estimated via the length of 10-K’s, leads to greater market under-reaction to 
10-K filings coupled with a 10-K announcement drift that lasts over a year.  Feldman, Govindaraj, 
Livnat, and Segal (2010), using the tone change in the management discussion and analysis section 
of 10-Qs and 10-Ks as an alternative measure of disclosure complexity, show that investors under-
react to such complicated disclosures leading to significant equity return drifts following the filing 
of a 10-Q or a 10-K.  Lehavy, Li and Merkley (2011) further add to this literature by showing that 
higher disclosure complexity, also measured via textual complexity, leads to greater analyst forecast 
dispersion and lower forecast accuracy.       
A recent working paper by Bushee, Gow and Taylor (2015) challenges the results of studies that 
utilize textual analysis for measuring firm complexity and suggests that the literature on disclosure 
complexity may require a significant overhaul.  Bushee et al. (2015) propose that relying on 
disclosure (language) complexity to proxy for business complexity may be misleading as while 
complex language could be used to genuinely convey information about complicated businesses it 
can also be used to obfuscate.  They disentangle the components of linguistic complexity related to 
                                                 
5
 For each conglomerate firm, a pseudo-conglomerate consists of a portfolio of the conglomerate firm’s segments made 
up using only stand-alone firms from the respective industries.  For each portfolio that corresponds to a specific 
segment of the conglomerate firm an equal-weighted return is calculated. Returns corresponding to each segment are 
then value-weighted according to that segment’s contribution to the conglomerate firm’s total revenues in order to 
calculate a corresponding pseudo conglomerate return. 
 
6
 It is in fact extremely difficult to distinguish between these two hypotheses as they are intimately related.  As pointed 
out by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), focusing one’s attention on one area would lead to opportunity costs in others.  
Hence, what we interpret as hard-to-process information in many cases may in fact be a reflection of the limited-
attention paid to that particular information by market participants if in fact difficulty of information processing in one 
area introduces significant opportunity costs in other areas. 
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obfuscation from the provision of information by comparing the linguistic complexity of managers 
to that of analysts.  Bushee et al. (2015) show that when managers’ linguistic complexity is similar 
to that of analysts, language complexity reveals the true economic complexity of the firm, but when 
the managers’ linguistic complexity is unrelated to that of analysts, managers simply use complex 
language to obfuscate.  Bushee et al. (2015) results would suggest that approximating for business 
complexity via disclosure complexity may not be the most direct or even most appropriate choice. 
To the extent that disclosure complexity is a noisy manifestation of underlying business complexity, 
it might be more prudent to use a significantly more direct measure of the firm’s business 
complexity by analyzing organizational structure
7
.   
The results in Miller (2010), You and Zhang (2009), Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal 
(2010) as well as Lehavy, Li and Merkley (2011) would suggest that disclosure complexity 
introduces informational frictions. Nevertheless, none of these studies particularly study the 
marginal impact of disclosure complexity on PEAD.  The only exception that comes close to 
analyzing the association of disclosure complexity with PEAD is Lee (2012).  Lee (2012) finds that, 
for the same level of earnings surprise, investors first underreact and then respond in the direction 
of the surprise with a delay to 10-Q filings if a given 10-Q is textually more complicated
8
.  
However, since 10-Q’s are filed at a date later than the actual earnings announcements,  Lee (2012) 
is not a direct investigation of the impact of disclosure (firm) complexity on PEAD but rather  an 
analysis of how earnings related information and disclosure complexity co-influence investor 
reaction to 10-Q filings.  Given the results of Bushee et al. (2015), it is not clear whether Lee (2012) 
captures the impact of business complexity on post-10-Q filing drift or the impact of managerial 
obfuscation.  In fact, Lee (2012) suggests that her results are a lot more in line with a managerial 
obfuscation explanation.  Furthermore, there is no investigation in Lee (2012) if the total 10-Q 
filing response, the negative immediate return reaction plus the positive return drift, leads to a net 
                                                 
7
 We thank Stan Markov for his specific recommendation to highlight the fact that disclosure complexity is a noisy 
proxy for the complexity of the underlying business. 
 
8
 Lee (2012) examines two dimensions of readability: (a) the length of quarterly reports as measured by the number of 
words contained in the 10-Q filing (LENGTH) and (b) the textual complexity of quarterly reports as measured by the 
Fog index (FOG). Lee’s (2012) proxy for difficult-to-read disclosures is unexpected readability, measured as the 
unexpected LENGTH and FOG. She calculates the unexpected LENGTH and FOG components by subtracting the 
expected length and Fog index from the raw length and Fog index respectively, where the expected length and 
Fog index are measured by the length and Fog index of the immediate preceding 10-Q filing. 
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increase or decrease on PEAD
9
 making it impossible to infer any conclusions regarding the impact 
of disclosure complexity on PEAD.    
This paper’s focus is to analyze how the underlying complexity of the firm’s business affects 
information processing about the firm around its earnings announcements. Given that disclosure 
complexity is at best a noisy approximate for business complexity and worse yet may not be related 
to it at all, we propose using organizational form as a direct measure of the complicatedness of the 
firm’s underlying business.   
We first hypothesize that the more complicated the organizational form the more costly and 
difficult it is for market participants to understand firm-specific information.  We get our inspiration 
for the first hypothesis from the established literature that studies the impact of focus-increasing 
restructurings on the information environment of the firm.  We contend that analysts, institutional 
investors and short sellers find information processing about conglomerates more difficult and 
costly compared to single-segment firms with comparable firm characteristics.  This occurs because 
first, it is much more costly to analyze information about consolidated firms as information about 
different business lines is not disaggregated; and second, it is not common for institutional 
investors, analysts and short-sellers to possess expertise about all parts of a conglomerate (Clement 
1999; Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu 2001; Chemmanur and Liu 2011; Hilary and Shen 2013).  
We test the validity of the first assumption by comparing analyst coverage, forecast dispersion, 
forecast errors; institutional ownership, turnover and short-selling activity for conglomerates and 
single-segment firms with similar firm-characteristics.   
Next, we hypothesize that conglomerates have larger PEAD compared to single-segment firms. 
Since conglomerates are more costly and difficult to understand, per our first hypothesis, this 
should naturally lead to slower information processing around their earnings announcements.  
Third, we hypothesize that the second hypothesis is not attributable to conglomerates releasing 
more news per unit of SUE but rather due to a genuine difficulty of processing firm-specific 
earnings information regarding conglomerates.  We test the validity of the third hypothesis by 
contrasting the immediate return reactions and delayed response ratios for single-segment firms and 
                                                 
9
 We analyze the direct impact of disclosure complexity on PEAD. To our surprise, we find that the interaction of 
surprise unexpected earnings (SUE) with firm-level textual complexity (FOG) predicts PEAD with a negative sign 
when we control for the impact of organizational structure on PEAD. This result would suggest that disclosure (textual) 
complexity may not be the best proxy for business complexity. 
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conglomerates for a hedge strategy that goes long on the largest SUE decile and short on the 
smallest SUE decile.   
Fourth, we hypothesize that the degree of complexity matters.  We support our fourth 
hypothesis by showing that an increase in firm complexity leads to higher PEAD and by 
documenting that more complicated conglomerates have larger PEADs than less complicated 
conglomerates.  Finally, we contend that the effect we study is distinctly different from results in 
Cohen and Lou (2012) who investigate how industry-wide news gets incorporated into the prices of 
single-segment firms and conglomerates.  To distinguish the impact of business complexity on 
returns attributable to firm-specific news from the impact of business complexity on returns 
attributable to industry-wide news we specifically control for potential spillover from the 
predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012) in our PEAD analyses.     
In an attempt to establish the uniqueness of our results we need to control for alternative 
explanations for PEAD other than disclosure complexity.  In a recent paper Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy (2012) document that post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is a function of 
both the magnitude of an earnings surprise (SUE) and its persistence.  Cao and Narayanamoorthy 
(2012) show that, contrary to the expectations of the market, firms with higher (lower) earnings 
volatility have lower (higher) earnings surprise (SUE) persistence and document that PEAD returns 
due to earnings volatility are concentrated in firms with the smallest trading frictions, i.e. those 
firms that have the lowest ex-ante earnings volatility.  Since conglomerates, on average, have 
smaller trading frictions than single-segment firms we control for the impact of ex-ante earnings 
volatility (EarnVol) on PEAD and document that our results are virtually unchanged and as such are 
distinct from the impact of ex-ante earnings volatility on PEAD studied in Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy (2012).   
In another paper, that investigates the impact of information complexity on PEAD, Chen (2013) 
documents that investors have difficulty understanding the time-varying nature of earnings 
persistence and their failure to incorporate this characteristic into the accounting and economic 
fundamentals leads to the post-earnings announcement drift.  If there is a systematic difference in 
the time-varying nature of earnings persistence between single-segment firms and conglomerates, 
then such a difference could explain our findings.  We find that controlling for the impact of time-
varying earnings persistence (EP) documented in Chen (2013) slightly reduces the coefficient on 
the interaction of SUE with the conglomerate dummy but our main results are largely unchanged 
11 
 
 
suggesting that the impact of business complexity, measured via organizational structure, on PEAD 
is distinct from the impact of time-varying earnings persistence on PEAD.   
Finally, we investigate whether varying analyst responsiveness for conglomerates and single-
segment firms could explain our results.  Following Zhang (2008), we construct a measure of 
analyst responsiveness (DRESP) and investigate whether its interaction with SUE could reduce the 
economic and statistical impact of business complexity on PEAD.  Our results suggest that impact 
of DRESP on PEAD can’t explain our main findings, either.   
 
3. DATA 
We use three measures of firm complexity
10
.  The first measure, Conglo, is the conglomerate 
dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. The firm is deemed to be a 
conglomerate if it has business divisions in two or more different industries, according to 
Compustat segment files. Industries are defined using two-digit SIC codes. The second measure of 
complexity, NSeg, is the number of divisions with different two-digit SIC codes. The third measure, 
Complexity, is a continuous variable based on sales concentration.  Complexity equals 1-HHI, 
where HHI is the sum of sales shares of each division squared, HHI=∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1
, where sales share, si, 
for each division is the fraction of total sales generated by that division.  According to the third 
definition of complexity, a firm with sales in a single segment would have a Complexity measure of 
0, whereas a firm with sales in a large number of industries could achieve a Complexity score close 
to 1. 
Our measure of PEAD is the slope from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression of cumulative 
post-announcement returns on earnings surprises.  Post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) are cumulated between trading day 2 and trading day 60 after the earnings announcement. 
CARs are size and book-to-market adjusted following Daniel et al. (1997) (also known as DGTW). 
Earnings announcement dates are from COMPUSTAT, and daily returns are from CRSP daily files.  
We measure earnings surprise as standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), defined as the difference 
between earnings per share in the current quarter and earnings per share in the same quarter of the 
                                                 
10
 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) define dispersion in segment earnings growth rates, HTSD, as a measure of inattention. 
We interpret HTSD as both a measure of limited attention and firm complexity.  Since we utilize HTSD only in Table 7 
we don’t introduce it as a measure of complexity in this section.    
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previous year, scaled by the share price for the current quarter
11
.  Since we calculate SUE and 
PEAD values as in Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) we use the same sample selection criteria. In 
doing so, we restrict the sample to firm-quarter observations with price per share greater than $1 as 
of the end of quarter t in an effort to reduce noise caused by small SUE deflators.  We also keep 
only those observations with non-negative book value of equity at the end of quarter t-1, while 
excluding those observations with market value of equity less than $5 million at the end of quarter 
t-1.   
Our sample period is determined by the availability of the segment data and lasts from January 
1977 to December 2010.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.   
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics, Organizational Structure and Limits to Arbitrage 
Complex firms tend to be larger, more liquid, less volatile, and more transparent and as such 
they are expected to have lower limits to arbitrage. In this section, we empirically verify the 
relationship between firm complexity and the traditional measures of limits to arbitrage.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the full distribution of SUE, Complexity=1-HHI, and number of 
segments for all firms and for conglomerates only. A few numbers are particularly noteworthy. 
First, it is important to note that SUE changes by 0.139 (0.064 minus -0.075) between the 95th and 
the 5th percentiles and by 0.274 (0.129 minus -0.145) between the 97.5th and the 2.5th SUE 
percentiles. This would suggest that the spread in CARs between firms with SUEs in the 97.5th and 
the 2.5th percentiles will be roughly double that of the spread in CARs between firms with SUEs in 
the 95th and the 5th percentiles.  Second, we notice that most firms in our sample are not 
conglomerates (the median number of segments in the full sample is 1) and most conglomerates 
have two segments (the median number of segments for conglomerates is 2 except for a few years 
early in the sample)
12
.  A relatively large number of conglomerates report three segments and some 
have four segments, whereas conglomerates with five or more segments make up less than 2.5% of 
the sample.  Third, the distribution of complexity suggests that there are a significant number of 
low-complexity firms.  For example, a two-segment firm where one segment accounts for 95% of 
                                                 
11
 Using alternative specifications of SUE, such as calculating SUE as the deviation from consensus analyst forecasts, 
yields results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
12
 In untabulated results, we find that 27% of firms in the sample are conglomerates. This number varies from 47% in 
the late 1970s to 17% in the late 1990s back to 25% in the 2000s. 
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the revenues would have a complexity measure of 0.095. This level of complexity is comparable to 
the 10
th
 complexity percentile in our sample which is only 0.079. A two-segment firm where one 
segment accounts for 90% of sales has the complexity measure of 0.18.  This level of complexity is 
comparable to the 25
th
 complexity percentile among conglomerates.  These observations suggest 
that even small segments are reported in Compustat, and that we are not lumping together single-
segment firms with conglomerates that have a lot of small segments.  
The rest of Table 1 compares the firm characteristics of single-segment firms and multi-
segment firms (conglomerates).  Multi-segment firms are firms that have business segments with 
more than one two-digit SIC code, according to Compustat segment files. Single-segment firms are 
those firms that are classified in Compustat segment files and operate in a single industry.  "All 
Compustat firms" in the table refers to the aggregation of single-segment and multi-segment firms 
with non-missing quarterly earnings
13
. 
In Panel B, we summarize earnings surprises (SUE) and announcement returns (CAR(1;+1)) 
for the three types of firms specified as above.  CAR(-1;+1) is size and book-to-market adjusted as 
in DGTW. Panel B1 reports the mean CAR values, in an attempt to assess whether conglomerates, 
on average, have more positive earnings surprises, and Panel B2 reports the means of absolute 
values of CAR(-1;+1), testing whether earnings surprises experienced by conglomerates are 
different in magnitude.   
We find in Panel B that conglomerates experience earnings surprises that are significantly 
smaller in magnitude than the earnings surprises experienced by single-segment firms. Panel B1 
reveals that SUEs and announcement CARs of the two firm groups (single-segment and multi 
segment) are, on average, positive at 15.6 bp and 15.5 bp, respectively, and that conglomerates have 
somewhat more positive SUEs, but the difference is never statistically significant.  
Panel B2 shows that the magnitude of the announcement CARs is significantly smaller for 
conglomerates than it is for single-segment firms, whereas the average absolute magnitude of SUE 
is similar for both groups of firms.  
Panel C summarizes the median values of several liquidity measures for single-segment firms, 
and multi-segment firms. The first three - the Gibbs measure (Hasbrouck, 2009), the Roll (1984) 
measure, and the effective spread estimate of Corwin and Schultz (2012) estimate the effective bid-
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 The number of firms in quarterly Compustat files is larger than the number of firms reported in Compustat segment 
files, because single-segment firms and firms with relatively small segments do not have to report segment data. 
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ask spread. We find that the bid-ask spread of a representative conglomerate is roughly one-third to 
two-thirds lower than the bid-ask spread of a representative single-segment firm.  The fourth 
liquidity measure, the Amihud (2002) measure, estimates the price impact and shows that 
conglomerates experience 50% less price impact when compared to a representative single-segment 
firm.  The last measure is a catch-all trading cost measure from Lesmond et al. (1999). This 
measure calculates the fraction of zero-return days in each firm-year and assumes that stocks are not 
traded when the trading costs are higher than the expected profit from trading.  Thus, a greater 
fraction of zero-return days is synonymous with higher trading costs. We find that for 
conglomerates the median number of zero-return days is 11.8%, as opposed to 14.1% for single-
segment firms and that the difference is statistically significant.  
In summary, all liquidity measures in Panel C strongly suggest that conglomerates are 
significantly more liquid than single-segment firms. Thus, the liquidity measures suggest that if the 
link between PEAD and complexity were driven by liquidity effects, then PEAD would be stronger 
for simpler firms, contrary to our hypothesis. This observation also suggests that, controlling for the 
interaction between PEAD and liquidity would make the relation between PEAD and complexity 
economically even more significant.  
We conclude, given the fact that on average conglomerates are larger and more liquid, that they 
should have significantly lower limits to arbitrage. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Information Production for Conglomerates and similar Simple firms  
Our analysis in Table 1 clearly demonstrates that conglomerates have lower limits to arbitrage.  
Nevertheless, relying on the extant literatures on focus-increasing corporate restructuring events 
and the impact of analyst and investor expertise on information production we hypothesize that 
information about conglomerates could be harder to process.  Difficulty of processing information 
regarding conglomerates, in turn, can discourage analysts from following and sophisticated 
investors and traders from investing and trading in conglomerates leading to lower information 
production about multi-segment firms compared to single-segment firms.  
In Table 2, we analyze the link between firm complexity and information production about the 
firm by comparing single-segment firms and conglomerates across several dimensions.  We 
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specifically investigate the impact of business complexity on the information production of equity 
analysts, institutional investors and short sellers.  Furthermore, we also investigate the differences 
in accounting disclosure quality of conglomerates and single-segment firms where the accounting 
disclosure quality is measured using segment disclosure quality.  For institutional ownership and 
share of short selling activity we use traditional measures utilized in the literature.  For analyst 
coverage, in addition to utilizing the traditional measure of analyst coverage, the number of analysts 
following the firm, we also measure the quality of the coverage by analyzing the number and 
fraction of specialists following the firm. An analyst following a firm is categorized as a specialist 
in that quarter, if the analyst covers five or more firms in the same industry in a given quarter (we 
use both two-digit and three-digit SIC codes to define an industry). For a conglomerate, specialists 
are defined using the industry affiliation of its main segment.  
Size potentially has a large confounding effect on the link between firm complexity and 
information production about the firm.  While conglomerates are harder to understand due to their 
business complexity, the benefits of understanding conglomerates can be greater due to their larger 
size. Thus, in order to assess how business complexity impacts information production, we have to 
control for size by comparing conglomerates to single-segment firms of similar size.  
In Panel A of Table 2, we define firm size as its market cap and distribute conglomerates  
and single-segment firms into size deciles formed using CRSP breakpoints.  While this method of 
controlling for size is imperfect, it turns out powerful enough to elicit that conglomerates have less 
analyst coverage and their coverage is of lower quality than that of single-segment firms.  In all size 
deciles, conglomerates are followed by fewer analysts and fewer specialists.  We also observe that a 
smaller percentage of analysts covering conglomerates are specialists.  The biggest difference is in 
the number of specialists, as single-segment firms have 25% to 40% higher percentage of 
specialists. Both the relative and absolute differences in the analyst coverage peak in size deciles six 
to eight, suggesting that conglomerates which suffer from lower quality coverage are relatively 
large firms and are not obscure/micro-cap multi-segment firms.  
Once we control for size we also find that conglomerates suffer from larger analyst forecast 
errors due to the lower quality and the quantity of analyst coverage they receive. As the second 
bottom row of Panel A suggests, conglomerates have larger analyst forecast errors in all size deciles 
but one (decile two), and the difference is material: on average, conglomerates have 15% larger 
forecast errors compared to single-segment firms controlling for size.  Once again, the difference is 
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mainly observed in the deciles with the largest conglomerate population: the differences in forecast 
errors are particularly large, in relative terms, in size deciles seven, nine and ten.  Not only do we 
find the forecast errors to be larger for conglomerates compared to single-segment firms of similar 
size, but we also find the forecast dispersion regarding conglomerates is also larger (except for the 
two smallest size deciles) suggesting that market participants face a lot more uncertainty about 
conglomerates than comparable single segment firms. 
Further enhancing our hypothesis, we find that institutional investors and short sellers also find 
processing information about conglomerates harder.  Before controlling for size, conglomerates 
have significantly more institutional ownership compared to single-segment firms.  Sorting firms 
into size-deciles, however, leads to a significantly different conclusion. We find that while in size-
deciles five, six and seven conglomerates have more institutional ownership, the opposite is true in 
size deciles eight, nine and ten, somewhat counter to what one would expect.  We observe similar 
patterns regarding share turnover and relative short interest, as the difference in short interest 
(turnover) between single-segment firms and conglomerates increases with firm size.  Taken 
together, our analyses suggest that there is less information about conglomerates compared to 
single-segment firms of similar size and that the difficulty of information processing is especially 
higher for larger conglomerates. 
In Panel B2, we control for size in a different way: we match each conglomerate to a single-
segment firm with the closest market cap. We observe again, consistent with Panel A, that 
conglomerates are followed by 1-2 analysts and specialists less than single-segment firms of 
comparable size, which constitutes a difference of 20-30% in the quality of analyst coverage. In 
terms of fraction of specialists, we find, for example, that on average 70% of analysts covering a 
single-segment firm specialize in its three-digit SIC industry, but only 57% of analysts covering a 
conglomerate specialize in the three-digit SIC industry of its main segment.  All differences in 
analyst coverage are highly statistically significant and are observed in the vast majority of quarters.  
As a consequence of lower quality analyst coverage, Panel B2 also reports that analyst forecast 
error is 18% higher for conglomerates than it is for single-segment firms of the same size, and the 
difference is significant with a t-statistic of 3.29.  A similar result is observed for analyst forecast 
dispersion as forecast dispersion is 33% higher for conglomerates than it is for single-segment firms 
of the same size (.24 vs .18), and the difference is significant with a t-statistic of 3.24.  We find 
similar patterns for institutional ownership, relative short interest and turnover.  While before size-
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matching the average conglomerate has 3.8% more institutional ownership, after size-matching, the 
level of institutional holding is indistinguishable between conglomerates and single segment firms.  
Similarly, the difference in the relative short interest (RSI) in single-segment firms and 
conglomerates also increases after size-matching.  Before-size matching average RSI for 
conglomerates is 2.2%, while it is 2.5% for single-segment firms for a 0.3% difference in favor of 
single-segment firms.  After size-matching this difference becomes even more severe and increases 
to 0.5%.  A very similar pattern is observed for turnover as before-size matching is 0.6% higher in 
favor of single-segment firms, but size-matching increases this difference to 1.4%. 
Significant differences between Panels B1 and B2 illustrate the importance of controlling for 
size when comparing conglomerates and single-segment firms for variables related to information 
production.  If we do not match by size, we would find that information production about 
conglomerates, due to their larger market cap, is significantly more.  This, in turn, would lead to 
significantly misleading conclusions. 
In Panel C we run panel regressions to better illustrate the role organizational structure plays on 
analyst coverage, institutional ownership, relative short interest and turnover
14
.  In doing so, in 
addition to firm size, we control for CAPM-beta, book-to-market, lagged returns, momentum 
returns, share price, capital structure, firm-age and other firm-characteristics deemed relevant by 
extant literature where necessary.  Regression results are in complete agreement with the results 
presented in Panels B and C as the coefficient on business complexity is negative and statistically 
highly significant regardless of the dependent variable as well as regardless of whether we use 
Conglo, Comp or Nseg as our proxy of business complexity. 
In Table 2, we find that while a representative conglomerate is covered by somewhat larger 
number of analysts than a representative single-segment firm due to the conglomerate being much 
larger, this extra coverage is of poor quality, since it comes primarily from non-specialists and 
probably even dilutes the average analyst quality. Controlling for the confounding effect of size 
makes the negative relation between firm complexity and the quality of analyst coverage really 
stand out:  when compared to single-segment firms of similar size, conglomerates are followed by a 
fewer number of analysts and specialists, and those analysts make larger forecast errors.  Lower 
information quality production about conglomerates compared to single-segment firms of similar 
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 For the panel regressions we run Panel C of Table 2 we cluster standard errors a-la Peterson (2009). 
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size is not confined to analysts.  We also find that institutional investors and short-sellers face 
similar difficulty about understanding conglomerates.  We conclude that the complex nature of 
operating in multiple lines of business makes conglomerates significantly more difficult to 
understand in the eyes of market participants including equity analysts, institutional investors and 
short sellers.  Next, we investigate the implications of hard-to-process information regarding 
conglomerates on how the market reacts to firm-specific information about them compared to 
single-segment firms. 
 
4.2 Main Result: Business Complexity leads to higher Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
Table 3 presents our main results, as we study the relation between PEAD and business 
complexity.  We perform Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with post-announcement cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR(2;60))
15
 on the left-hand side and earnings surprise (SUE) and its 
interaction with alternative measures of firm complexity on the right-hand side. Our measure of 
PEAD is the (positive) slope on SUE. Higher values of complexity measures utilized in this study 
correspond to a higher degree of complexity by construction. In this context observing a stronger 
PEAD for complex firms is associated with finding a positive coefficient on the interaction of SUE 
and complexity
16
.   
The literature on price momentum (see, e.g., Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, Lesmond et al., 
2004, Zhang, 2006, and others) finds a puzzling absence of momentum for microcaps (stocks in the 
lowest NYSE/AMEX market cap quintile).  Consequently, all results that momentum is stronger for 
firms with higher limits to arbitrage hold only in the sample with microcaps excluded.  Since PEAD 
and price momentum are two related anomalies, we choose to exclude microcaps from our analysis 
as well.  Another benefit of excluding microcaps is that microcaps are dominated by single-segment 
firms, and our regression analysis that compares PEAD for single-segment firms and conglomerates 
would have virtually no basis for such a comparison among microcaps.  
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 We use size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns as in DGTW. 
 
16
 We compare PEAD for comparable levels of earnings surprise in an effort to understand whether investors take 
longer to process the same amount of information when they are confronted with more complex firms. A positive 
loading on the interaction of business complexity with SUE, however, would also imply a tradable strategy as described 
in Fama (1976), who shows in Chapter 9 that slopes from Fama-MacBeth regressions are returns to tradable portfolios.  
In Tables 4 and 9, we further study the tradability of this strategy using portfolios. 
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The first column in Table 3 estimates PEAD in the pairwise regression of CAR(2;60) on SUE. 
The regression estimates that the difference in SUE between the 97.5th and 2.5
th
 (95th and the 5th) 
SUE percentiles implies a CAR of 3.23% (1.64%) in the three months following the announcement. 
In the second column, we perform the first test of our main hypothesis by regressing CARs on 
SUE, the conglomerate dummy, and the interaction of SUE and the conglomerate dummy.  The 
interaction of the conglomerate dummy and SUE is highly significant and suggests that for 
conglomerates PEAD is 2.3% (1.17%) greater per three months than it is for single-segment firms 
when we estimate the difference in the PEADs by using the SUE differential between the 97.5th 
and the 2.5th (95th and 5th) SUE percentiles
17
.  
The third column estimates the relation between PEAD and conglomerate status controlling for 
the effect of Size, BM, conglomerate status and the interaction of SUE with Size and BM 
respectively.  We find that controlling for the interactions of SUE with fundamental firm 
characteristics increases the loading on the interaction term between SUE and the conglomerate 
dummy approximately by 25%. 
Columns four and five repeat the analyses conducted in columns two and three, and replace the 
conglomerate dummy with the continuous complexity measure Comp, 1-HHI. The results in 
columns four and five are qualitatively similar to the results in columns two and three: more 
complex firms have significantly stronger PEAD for the same level of SUE, and this relation 
increases in magnitude when we control for Size, BM, Comp and the interactions of SUE with Size 
and BM. The magnitude of the coefficient on the product of SUE and the complexity measure, 
Comp, suggests that the effect of the interaction term on PEAD is roughly equal to the impact 
estimated in columns two and three: the median level of the complexity variable for conglomerates 
is about 0.37
18
, thus the slope of 0.184 in column five would estimate the difference in PEADs of a 
representative single-segment firm and a representative conglomerate at 1.81% (0.94%) when the 
SUE differential between the 97.5th and the 2.5th (95th and 5th) percentiles is used in the 
estimation. 
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 We control for Conglo in this regression but don’t report it.  For brevity, in this paper we only report the effect on 
SUE and the interaction of SUE with the independent variables used. 
 
18
 Complexity of 0.37, or HHI equal to 0.63, roughly corresponds to a two-segment firm with one segment taking 
slightly over 75% of sales, or to a three-segment firm with one segment taking 78% of sales and the other two taking 
12% and 10% respectively. 
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Columns six and seven use the number of segments (with different two-digit SIC codes) as a 
proxy for complexity.  Once again, the interaction term between SUE and complexity, Nseg, is 
statistically significant and the economic significance of the interaction term increases after 
controlling for complexity, Size, BM and the interactions of SUE with Size and BM, and is 
qualitatively similar to the effect documented in columns two to five. 
 
4.3 Controlling for Announcement Effects and Comparison of Delayed Response Ratios 
One possible explanation of why complex firms have stronger PEAD is that the information 
revealed by complex firms on the announcement day takes longer to diffuse.  However, an 
alternative explanation would suggest that, for the same level of earnings surprise, more 
information is revealed to the market on the announcement day in the case of complex firms.  If this 
indeed is the case, then for complex firms we should see a stronger response around the 
announcement event followed by a stronger drift. Empirically, the alternative scenario would 
suggest that regressing announcement returns (CAR(-1;+1)) as well as the post earnings 
announcement drift returns (CAR(2;+60)) on the interaction of SUE and firm complexity, would 
both yield a positive coefficient.   
In Panel A of Table 4, we perform Fama-MacBeth regressions of announcement returns (size 
and book-to-market adjusted as in DGTW, cumulated over the period from the day before to the 
day after the earnings announcement) as well as PEAD returns on the top decile earnings surprise 
dummy (SUETop), its interactions with Conglo, Size and BM, as well as Conglo, Size, and BM 
themselves. Following our approach in Table 3, we exclude microcaps (firms with market cap in the 
lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile) from the sample.  SUETop is 1 for the top SUE decile and 0 for 
the bottom SUE decile and helps us capture hedge returns to going long on the highest SUE decile 
and going short on the lowest SUE decile.  CAR(-1;+1) column in the Panel A of Table 4 reveals 
that the interaction of SUETop with Conglo is zero and statistically insignificant.  This finding 
indicates that single-segment firms and conglomerates have similar hedge returns in the three days 
around earnings announcements, and suggests that it is unlikely that there is more news released by 
conglomerates with respect to single-segment firms for the same level of earnings surprise.  On the 
other hand, the CAR(2;+60) column in the Panel A of Table 4 clearly indicates that a hedge strategy 
of going long on the highest SUE decile and going short on the lowest SUE decile would net larger 
PEAD hedge-returns for conglomerates than single-segment firms as the interaction of SUETop and 
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Conglo is economically and statistically significant.  Taken together, results in the CAR(-1;+1) and  
CAR(2;+60) columns, suggest that conglomerates under-react to earnings announcements when 
compared to single-segment firms.   
Following Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) we quantify the magnitude of the earnings surprise 
under-reaction for conglomerates.  We utilize the results in Panel A to estimate what fraction of 
information in the earnings announcement is incorporated into stock prices outside of the earnings 
announcement window. Specifically, in Panel B, we calculate the ratio of the drift return, 
CAR(+2,+60), to the total earnings reaction return, CAR(-1,+60), to measure the delayed response 
ratio for single-segment firms and conglomerates, respectively, and calculate the difference in the 
delayed response ratios for these two groups of firms for a hedge portfolio that trades in extreme 
positive (negative) surprise earnings deciles.  We find that the delayed response ratio for this hedge 
trade is 42.4% (31%) for conglomerates (single-segment firms), which is 11.4% more than it is for 
the delayed response ratio faced by single-segment firms.  Our analysis lends further support to the 
interpretation that investors have more difficulty processing earnings related information regarding 
conglomerates and that information processing takes more time for complex firms.  The portfolio 
approach adopted to measure the delayed response ratio also makes it abundantly clear that it is 
indeed possible to trade this strategy. 
 
4.4 Impact of Complexity on PEAD in Event-time 
Cohen and Lou (2012) find that returns to pseudo-conglomerates, made up of single-segment 
firms, predict the returns to conglomerates in the next month and conclude that firm complexity 
slows down investors’ reaction to industry-wide news. The industry-wide news is first reflected in 
the prices of simple firms and then the prices of complicated firms move in the same direction. 
Cohen and Lou find that the predictability is limited to only one month: it takes the investors in 
complicated firms only one extra month to process the industry-wide shocks and set the prices of 
conglomerates roughly right, or at least make them unpredictable using returns to single-segment 
firms. 
As this paper shows, earnings-related information is another type of information investors in 
conglomerates have trouble digesting. Thus, it is interesting to find out whether reacting to earnings 
related information also takes investors in multi-segment firms a month, as in the related example 
documented in Cohen and Lou, or longer.   
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To this end, in Table 5 we disaggregate post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (size 
and book-to-market adjusted as in DGTW) into three pieces - CAR(2;20), CAR(21;40), and 
CAR(41;60) - each approximately a month long and re-run the regressions from Table 3 for each 
sub-period separately.  We repeat our analyses for alternative measures of complexity.  In particular 
Panel A uses conglomerate status, Conglo; Panel B uses 1-HHI measure, Comp; and Panel C uses 
number of segments, NSeg, as our proxy for business complexity.  
The first column of each panel in Table 5 repeats our main analysis in Table 3.  The next three 
columns conduct the same regression, by utilizing alternative CAR windows.  Each column is 
labeled with the event window utilized in that column.  We find that the dependence of PEAD on 
firm complexity stays visible for two months, being, if anything, stronger in the second month.  In 
the third month, the interaction between SUE and complexity loses statistical significance, while 
remaining economically significant. On the other hand, in the third month, PEAD is insignificant 
for single-segment firms, too, and the (point estimate of the) ratio of PEAD for simple and 
complicated firms does not seem to change much with time.  Our results are similar whichever 
complexity measure we utilize. 
We conclude therefore that it takes investors in complicated firms longer to process earnings 
related information than it takes them to process industry-wide shocks studied by Cohen and Lou 
(2012). The difference in PEADs between simple and complicated firms lasts for at least two 
months. 
 
4.5 Impact of Changes to Organizational Form on the Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
While all proxies for limits to arbitrage we considered are negatively related to complexity and 
therefore cannot explain our finding that PEAD is stronger for complex firms, it is still possible that 
complexity and conglomerate status in particular are related to a certain unknown variable that in 
turn affects the strength of PEAD.  
In an effort to understand if investors really have difficulty interpreting information related to 
more complicated firms we focus on periods during which firm complexity increases.  If the level 
of firm complexity (conglomerate status) is related to a certain unknown variable that also drives 
PEAD, then new conglomerates would likely have little exposure to this variable and one would 
expect new conglomerates to have low levels of PEAD.  Under our hypothesis, however, investors 
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should have the greatest confusion when interpreting earnings announcements of new 
conglomerates, due to the significant and recent change to their complexity level.  
In Panel A of Table 6, we use a dummy variable for the change in the conglomerate status 
called NewConglo.  NewConglo is set to one in the year after the firm switches from having one 
segment to having more than a single segment, continues to be one for another year, and becomes 
zero afterwards. NewConglo is also zero in all years when the firm has only one segment. In an 
average year, we have about 5,000 firms with segment data, about 1,300 conglomerates, and 120-
200 new conglomerates, for which NewConglo is 1.  Thus, new conglomerates comprise 2.5-4% of 
our sample and 10-15% of all conglomerates.  
The first column of Panel A presents our baseline regression from column three of Table 3 
(post-announcement CAR on SUE, the Conglo dummy, Size, BM and the interactions of SUE with 
Size, BM and Conglo) with the NewConglo dummy and its interaction with SUE added. The slope 
on the product of SUE and NewConglo estimates the extra PEAD experienced by new 
conglomerates as compared to existing conglomerates, since Conglo is, by construction, always 1 
when NewConglo is 1.  
We make two important observations based on the analysis conducted in the first column of 
Panel A in Table 6. First, PEAD experienced by existing conglomerates (firms that have been 
conglomerates for more than two years) is more than twice the PEAD experienced by single-
segment firms. The regression estimates suggest that PEAD is 1.31% (per three months after the 
announcement) for single-segment firms and 2.32% for existing conglomerates when we use the 
difference between the 95th and the 5th percentiles of SUE to calculate differences in PEAD
19
.  We 
conclude that controlling for the effect of new conglomerates does not reduce the significance of the 
interaction term between PEAD and the conglomerate dummy.  The interaction term is as strong as 
it is in Table 3, which suggests that stronger PEADs for more complex firms cannot be attributed to 
firms that recently have become conglomerates.  
Second, we do find that PEAD is significantly stronger for new conglomerates than it is for 
single-segment firms as well as it is for existing conglomerates.  The product of SUE and 
NewConglo dummy is statistically significant and its coefficient implies that for new conglomerates 
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 The estimates of PEAD would be roughly twice in magnitude for both single-segment firms and existing 
conglomerates if we instead use the difference between the 97.5th and the 2.5th percentiles of SUE. 
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PEAD is 4.7% per three months, almost double that of existing conglomerates and more than four 
times that of single-segment firms.  
How are new conglomerates created?  In roughly two-thirds of the cases, we are able to trace 
the increase in the number of segments to M&A activity using SDC data. In the other one-third of 
the cases it appears that the firm expands from within, starting a new line of business on its own.  
The estimates of PEAD would be roughly twice in magnitude for both single-segment firms and 
existing conglomerates if we instead use the difference between the 97.5th and the 2.5th percentiles 
of SUE.  
In the next two columns of Panel A we try to estimate the PEADs of new conglomerates 
formed through acquisitions (we replace NewConglo with NewCongloM&A, which equals one 
only if the change in the conglomerate status can be attributed to a merger with a firm from a 
different two-digit SIC code on SDC) and the PEADs of new conglomerates created from within 
(replacing NewConglo with NewCongloNoM&A, which equals one only if the change in the 
conglomerate status cannot be traced back to a corresponding merger).  
We do not have a strong prior regarding whether becoming a new conglomerate through M&A 
activity or via expansion from within leads to more confusion on the part of investors.  On the one 
hand, the segment added through M&A activity is more likely to be completely new to the firm 
(whereas the new line of business could have been developing within the firm for several years 
before the firm starts reporting it as a separate segment) and firms may prefer to expand through 
M&A activity when venturing into more "distant" industries.  These considerations would suggest 
that stronger PEADs for new conglomerates would be more attributable to new conglomerates 
formed through M&A activity. On the other hand, both the acquirer and the target receive a lot of 
scrutiny during a merger, and the target also has a history as a stand-alone firm before the merger. 
Such scrutiny and the availability of historical information about the target might suggest that 
higher PEADs for new conglomerates might be driven by new conglomerates that are formed via 
expansion from within rather than those that are formed through M&A activity.  
Panel A strongly supports the latter view. In column two, which singles out new conglomerates 
that are created through mergers, we find that PEAD is higher only by 0.5% per three months for 
these new conglomerates than it is for existing conglomerates (the difference, measured by the 
slope on the product of SUE and NewCongloM&A, is statistically insignificant).  In column three 
though, we focus on new conglomerates that are created from within (i.e., not through a merger), 
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and we discover a huge difference in the PEADs of these new conglomerates and the PEADs of 
existing conglomerates. Substituting the difference in SUE between the 95th and the 5th percentiles 
into the regression in the third column, we estimate the average PEAD for single-segment firms at 
1.1% (per three months after the announcement), the average PEAD of existing conglomerates at 
2.3%, and the average PEAD of new conglomerates created from within at a whopping 8.8%.  We 
conclude therefore that the stronger average PEAD for firms that have recently become 
conglomerates is attributable primarily to firms that have created a new line of business from 
within, without merging with another firm from a different industry.  
In Panel B, we utilize a different measure of increase in complexity: the SegInc dummy that 
equals 1 for all firms that experience an increase in the number of segments in the past two years 
and zero otherwise (by definition, SegInc is zero for all single-segment firms). Firms with SegInc=1 
include firms with NewConglo=1 as a subset, but some firms with SegInc=1 are not new 
conglomerates, they are old conglomerates that have expanded into yet another industry (for 
example, a firm that reports three segments in year t and four segments in years t+1 and t+2 will 
have SegInc=1 in years t+1 and t+2).  
The obvious upside of using SegInc instead of NewConglo is that there are more firms that 
experience an increase in the number of segments than those that become new conglomerates. In 
fact, in a representative year, there are on average 180 firms that add a new segment, while the 
number of single segment firms that become new conglomerates never exceeds 100 (the number of 
firm-years with SegInc(NewConglo)=1 is twice the number of firms that experience an increase in 
segments (that become a new conglomerate), because we track new conglomerates and firms with 
an increase in the number of segments for two years). The downside of using SegInc is that adding 
an extra segment to a three-segment firm is clearly a less drastic change than turning a single-
segment firm into a conglomerate.  
In the first column of Panel B, we regress CAR on SUE, its product with the number of 
segments (NSeg), and its product with SegInc, as well as NSeg and SegInc by themselves. We use 
NSeg rather than the Conglo dummy (used in Panel A), because now we are comparing not the 
PEADs of new and old conglomerates, but rather the PEADs of conglomerates with the same 
number of segments that have and have not recently experienced an increase in the number of 
segments.  This is what the slope on the product of SUE and SegInc measures: the difference in 
PEADs between, say, two three-segment firms, one of which has recently become a three-segment 
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firm (out of a single-segment or a two-segment firm) and the other that has stayed as a three 
segment firm for at least two years.  
The first column of Panel B finds that firms with a recent increase in the number of segments 
have significantly higher PEADs as compared to firms with the same number of segments that have 
not experienced a change in their number of segments. Substituting the differential between the 
95th and the 5th SUE percentiles, we estimate the average PEAD for a single-segment firm at 
1.15% (per three months after the announcement) for a three-segment firm with no recent increase 
in the number of segments at 2.59%, and for a three-segment firm that recently added a new 
segment (or two) in the past two years at 4.88%
20
.  As the regression suggests, the difference in 
PEADs between the latter two types of firms is also statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.26. 
In the next two columns, we disaggregate segment increase (SegInc=1) events into two 
subsets:  one group of events attributable to M&A activity (those cases of a firm adding a segment 
or several segments that can be traced to M&A activity on SDC) and a second group of events that 
are not attributable to such activity, and instead most likely attributable to adding a new line of 
business for which the firm deploys its internal resources. The estimates in the second column 
suggest that an increase in the number of segments through M&A has an economically sizeable, but 
statistically insignificant effect on PEAD: the difference in PEAD between two, say, three-segment 
firms, one of which added a segment or two through M&A in the past two years and the other one 
that did not is 1.31% (per three months after the earnings announcement), with a t-statistic of 0.93.  
The third column of Panel B, consistent with the third column of Panel A, shows that adding 
segments from within impacts firm complexity more.  Comparing two firms with the same number 
of segments shows that, the firm that adds a new line of business by growing from within has a 
PEAD that is 3.85% greater than the PEAD of the firm which adds a new line of business through 
M&A activity. 
To sum up, Table 5 strongly suggests that the increase in complexity (defined either as an 
increase in the number of segments or as the change in the conglomerate status) is associated with a 
large increase in PEAD, consistent with our hypothesis that it is firm complexity (and not any other 
characteristic common to conglomerates) that creates stronger PEAD. We also find that investors 
                                                 
20
 The regressions in Panel B assume that the slope on SUE equals a+b·N Seg +c·SegInc, where a is the slope of the 
SUE term, b is the slope of the interaction of SUE and NSeg, c is the slope of the interaction of SUE and SegInc. 
Hence, the PEAD of single-segment firms is a + b times the SUE differential. 
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are most confused about firms that expand from within, i.e. about those firms that add segments 
without being involved in M&A activity. 
 
4.6 Does the Degree of Complexity Matter? Using Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) Measure  
In the previous sections we have established that there is a strong relationship between 
organizational structure and the strength of PEAD.  In this section we investigate if PEAD is 
stronger for more complicated conglomerates.  In doing so we construct a measure proposed by 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) that enables us to rank conglomerates based on their level of 
complexity.  
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest that the high cognitive processing costs associated with 
analyzing earnings growth at the segment level leads at least some investors to focus on aggregated 
information even if segment level data are available.  In line with this hypothesis they propose that 
even if only some investors use aggregate firm earnings growth rates to estimate future firm values, 
instead of using segments’ individual earnings growth rates, these conglomerates will be mispriced.  
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) interpret the dispersion of the segment growth rates as a measure of 
investor inattention imposed by the high cognitive processing costs due to harder-to-process nature 
of such information.  They suggest that the level of mispricing (cognitive processing costs) will 
increase with the dispersion of the segment growth rates.   
We construct a new empirical proxy of conglomerate complexity following Hirshleifer and 
Teoh’s (2003) measure of investor inattention (cognitive processing costs).  We call this measure 
HTSD (Hirshleifer-Teoh-Segment-Dispersion) and calculate it as 𝐻𝑇𝑆𝐷 = ∑ (𝐸𝑖 − 𝑓)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑆𝑖, for 
a firm with N segments that has an aggregate earnings growth rate of f, where each segment i has 
growth rate 𝐸𝑖, and sales share as a percentage of the firm’s total sales which is equal to 𝑆𝑖.  We 
also compute log of one plus HTSD, LogHTSD, to account for HTSD’s high skewness. 
In the first column of Table 7, controlling for the effects of size and book-to-market and their 
interactions with SUE, we analyze the interaction of HTSD with SUE and find that conglomerates 
with greater segment earnings growth dispersion have larger post-earnings announcement drifts 
compared to other conglomerates for the same level of SUE.  The interaction term is 0.2 and 
statistically significant.  The interaction term indicates that the PEAD returns between the 97.5th 
and the 2.5th SUE percentiles for a conglomerate that is in the top decile based on the segment 
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growth dispersion measure
21
 would be 1.55% more than the PEAD returns between the 97.5th and 
the 2.5th SUE percentiles for a conglomerate that is in the bottom decile based on the HTSD 
measure.  In column two of Table 7 we repeat the same analysis using LogHTD and reach similar 
qualitative and quantitative conclusions.   
Results in Table 7 are in clear agreement with the theoretical deductions of Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2003).  Investors have more difficulty in understanding earnings related information 
regarding conglomerates with larger dispersion in their segment earnings growth rates.  Our results 
indicate that market participants take longer to incorporate earnings related information into the 
prices of more complicated conglomerates in line with Hirshleifer and Teoh’s (2003) suggestion 
that complexity introduces cognitive processing costs which lead to limited attention.  These results 
also help establish the fact that the degree of complexity also matters in determining the magnitude 
of PEAD as there is cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of PEAD with respect to business 
complexity in a universe of firms composed solely of conglomerates. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
5.1 Controlling for Potential Spillover from Industry-wide Information Events on PEAD  
The return predictability documented by Cohen and Lou (2012), though clearly different from 
our result, can potentially overlap with it in the following way:  if the industries the conglomerate 
operates in are doing well in month t-1, the conglomerate is more likely to report good earnings in 
month t.  If the earnings are particularly good, they will be followed by the post-announcement 
drift. However, part of this drift, at least in the first month (month t), can be explained by good 
returns to the pseudo-conglomerate in month t-1. Thus, the predictability documented by Cohen and 
Lou (2012) can partially explain why PEAD is stronger for conglomerates.  
Our prior is that the overlap between our result and the Cohen and Lou result is not strong.  
First, Cohen and Lou show that their predictability of conglomerate returns in month t using 
pseudo-conglomerate returns in month t-1 is attributable primarily to the first two weeks of month t. 
Since an average earnings announcement happens in the middle of the month, it would be fair to 
say that we will be missing those two weeks most of the time. Second, the predictability in Cohen 
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 The average for HTSD is 0.19 among conglomerates.  The 90
th
 percentile value of HTSD is .336 while the 10
th
 
percentile value for HTSD is 0.013.  
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and Lou lasts for only one month, whereas the stronger PEAD for conglomerates lasts for at least 
two months, as Table 5 shows.  
In Table 8, we explicitly control for pseudo-conglomerate returns (PCRet) by adding it into our 
main regressions of CARs on SUE, complexity, and the product of SUE and complexity. Following 
Cohen and Lou, PCRet is computed by first taking an equal-weighted average return of all single-
segment firms in each two-digit SIC industry, and then, for each conglomerate, value-weighting the 
industry returns by the fractions of the segments with the same two-digit SIC code that comprise the 
total sales of the conglomerate.  
Since our sample has to include both single-segment firms and conglomerates in order to 
compare the PEADs for the two types of firms, we have to substitute an alternative variable for 
"PCRet" for single-segment firms. We define "PCRet" of single-segment firms as the return to 
single segment firms in the same industry, thus turning it into a measure of industry momentum.  
We also control for in our regressions both PCRet itself and the interaction of PCRet with the 
conglomerate dummy, to allow for different slopes on it for single-segment firms and 
conglomerates.  
In the first column of Table 8, we regress CARs on SUE, Size, BM, interactions of SUE with 
Size and BM, PCRet and the interaction of PCRet with the conglomerate dummy.  We observe two 
results.  First, controlling for industry momentum in the form of "PCRet" for single-segment firms 
makes the slope on SUE somewhat smaller: it declines from 0.118 in the first column of Table 3 to 
0.106 in the first column of Table 8.  Second, we observe that PCRet itself is significant, while its 
product with the conglomerate dummy has a tiny, insignificant coefficient. This evidence implies 
that pseudo-conglomerate returns proposed by Cohen and Lou as well as measures of industry 
momentum are positively related to CARs
22
.  Indeed, since PCRet picks up industry momentum in 
the single-segment firms subsample and the Cohen and Lou predictability in the conglomerate 
subsample, the tiny insignificant coefficient on the interaction of PCRet and the conglomerate 
dummy suggests that the slopes on PCRet are the same in both subsamples and the Cohen and Lou 
predictability for conglomerates is just as strong as industry momentum for single-segment firms.  
                                                 
22
 Strictly speaking, the correct way to estimate industry momentum would be to compute industry returns using all 
firms in the industry, including conglomerates. We tried that and found little change in the slope of "PCRet" for single-
segment firms defined this way, which suggests that the average return to all single-segment firms in an industry is a 
good enough proxy for the true industry return. 
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The other three columns of Table 8 add to the regression in the first column a measure of 
complexity and its product with SUE. The slopes on the interaction of complexity with SUE 
estimate the additional PEAD experienced by conglomerates. The slopes estimated after controlling 
for the predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012) are similar in magnitude to the slopes 
estimated earlier in Table 3. We conclude that the stronger PEADs experienced by conglomerates is 
a separate phenomenon that has no overlap with the predictability of conglomerate returns using 
returns to pseudo-conglomerates as suggested by Cohen and Lou (2012). 
 
5.2 Controlling for Alternative Explanations of PEAD 
In Table 1 we show that conglomerates face lower limits to arbitrage compared to single-
segment firms.  Hence, higher PEAD for more complicated firms can’t be explained by limits-to-
arbitrage, in particular by the impact of institutional ownership (Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky 
2000); arbitrage risk (Mendenhall 2004); transactions costs (Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi 2008) or 
liquidity on PEAD (Sadka 2006) as conglomerates on average have larger institutional ownership, 
have lower idiosyncratic volatility, lower bid-ask spreads and higher liquidity compared to single-
segment firms. 
In Table 9, we control for the potential impact of a large number of alternative explanations of 
the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly using Fama-Macbeth (1973) style regressions.  In 
particular, we control for the impact of analyst responsiveness (Zhang 2008), the impact of ex-ante 
earnings volatility on earnings persistence (Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2012), the time-varying 
nature of earnings persistence (Chen 2013), as well as the impact of disclosure complexity (Miller 
2010, You and Zhang 2009, Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal 2010, Lehavy, Li and Merkley 
2011, Lee 2012) on PEAD in an effort to distinguish the impact of business complexity on PEAD. 
  The first column in Table 8 estimates the relation between PEAD and conglomerate status 
controlling for the effect of Size, BM, conglomerate status and the interaction of SUE with Size and 
BM respectively.  This is a repetition of column (3) of Table 3 to remind the reader of our basic 
finding in the full sample.  We use the results in column (1) of Table 9 as a benchmark for the other 
columns in Table 9.  This is important since using additional controls in other columns reduces the 
sample size in other columns and we want to make sure that our basic conclusions don’t change as 
the sample size changes. 
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In the second column of Table 9, we repeat the basic analysis conducted in column one for a 
subsample of firms for which we can calculate the time-varying earnings persistence variable (EP) 
proposed by Chen (2013)
23
.  Results are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to full-sample 
results.  The third column estimates the relation between PEAD and conglomerate status controlling 
for the effect of Size, BM, Conglo, time-varying earnings persistence (EP) and the interaction of 
SUE with Size, BM, Conglo and EP respectively.  We find that the interaction of SUE with EP has 
the predicted positive sign documented by Chen (2013).  Controlling for the interaction of SUE 
with EP reduces the loading on the interaction term between SUE and the conglomerate dummy 
approximately by 20%.  While this indicates there could be some overlap between the effect of 
time-varying earnings persistence introduced by Chen (2013) and business complexity, this overlap 
is not large enough to negate the higher PEAD we observe in conglomerates. 
The fourth and fifth columns investigate the impact of business complexity on PEAD while 
controlling for the impact of disclosure complexity.  Our proxy for disclosure complexity is the 
Gunning FOG index calculated as in Li (2008)
24
.  In column four, we investigate the impact of 
business complexity on PEAD for the sub-set of firms for which we have textual complexity 
information.  Column four reveals results consistent with our basic findings, in that conglomerates 
have higher PEAD compared to single-segment firms with similar characteristics in this sub-sample 
as well.  In column five we find a surprising result.  The interaction of SUE with FOG, our proxy 
for disclosure complexity, is negative and statistically significant suggesting that the post-earnings 
announcement drift anomaly in fact is smaller for firms with higher disclosure complexity.  We 
believe this result could potentially indicate that the interaction of FOG with SUE is more likely to 
capture the impact of managerial obfuscation on PEAD, rather than the impact of firm complexity.  
One rational explanation would be that, having seen an overly complicated disclosure, investors 
interpret this as an effort by the management to obfuscate and reverse their reaction to the earnings 
surprise over the PEAD window.  Future research may attempt to decompose FOG into firm-
complexity and managerial obfuscation components as in Bushee et al. (2015) and analyze the 
                                                 
23
 Earnings Persistence (EP) is the firm-specific time-varying autocorrelation between two adjacent quarterly seasonally 
differenced earnings (SDE), where the autocorrelation is estimated in a two-step procedure using 14 persistence-related 
firm characteristics each quarter following Chen (2013). 
 
24
 We got the data from Feng Li’s website, for which we are grateful. 
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impact of these components on PEAD separately.  Controlling for FOG doesn’t affect our results as 
the interaction of SUE with Conglo in column (5) is statistically and economically significant and 
virtually indistinguishable from the results in column (4).         
In columns six and seven, we analyze whether varying analyst responsiveness for 
conglomerates and single-segment firms could explain our results.  Following Zhang (2008), we 
construct a measure of analyst responsiveness (DRESP) and investigate whether its interaction with 
SUE could reduce the economic and statistical impact of business complexity on PEAD.  Column 
(6) reveals that our basic results go through for the sub-sample of firms with DRESP information.  
In column seven, we find that the interaction of SUE with DRESP is negative, qualitatively in line 
with Zhang (2008)’s prediction that more responsive analysts help investors react to earnings more 
timely and this leads to a reduction in PEAD
25
.  Controlling for the impact of analyst 
responsiveness doesn’t change our basic result regarding the impact of business complexity on 
PEAD as the interaction of SUE with Conglo is once again statistically and economically 
significant and positive. 
In a recent paper Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012) show that, contrary to the expectations of 
the market, firms with higher ex-ante (lower) earnings volatility (trading frictions) have lower 
(higher) earnings surprise (SUE) persistence and this leads to lower PEAD.  Since conglomerates, 
on average, have smaller earnings volatility (EarnVol) and fewer overall trading frictions it is 
imperative that we control for this effect.  In column eight, we analyze the impact of organizational 
structure on PEAD for a subset of firms for which we have ex-ante earnings volatility, calculated as 
in Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012).  We find that our results are virtually the same as the full-
sample results in that conglomerates have larger PEAD for the same level of SUE compared to 
single-segment firms.  In column nine we explicitly control for the impact of ex-ante earnings 
volatility on PEAD.  Our results are consistent with Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012), in that 
higher ex-ante earnings volatility leads to lower PEAD, as evidenced by the economically and 
statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction of SUE and EarnVol.  This, however, 
barely affects our main finding as the interaction of SUE with Conglo is 0.097 and statistically 
                                                 
25
 Unlike Zhang (2008), however, our interaction term is statistically insignificant.  We attribute this difference mainly 
to methodology.  When we use panel regressions, instead of Fama-MacBeth (1973) style regressions, the interaction 
term becomes significant.   
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significant.  This leads us to conclude that our result about the impact of business complexity is 
distinct from the impact of ex-ante earnings volatility on PEAD. 
Finally, in column ten we control for the impact of EP, FOG, DRESP and EarnVol along with 
business complexity and find that the interaction of SUE with Conglo is statistically and 
economically significant, verifying the distinctiveness of the effect we have uncovered in this paper. 
 
5.3 Accounting for Non-Linearity in SUE and Using Alternative CAR Measures  
In our final robustness section we use an alternative measure of abnormal returns namely four-
factor Carhart alphas.  In Table 10, we repeat our basic analyses from Table 3 using Carhart alphas 
on three alternatives measures of unexpected earnings surprise along with three alternative 
measures of firm complexity (Conglo, Comp, NSeg) for a total of nine regressions.  In particular, 
we run quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of firm-specific Carhart alphas in the 60 trading days 
(one-quarter) following earnings announcements αC(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), interactions 
of SUE with the measures of firm complexity (Conglo, Comp and Nseg) and with standard controls 
(Size and BM).  
Columns one to three use the baseline definition of SUE, where we winsorize SUE at 99.5% 
and 0.5% percentile levels every given quarter in order to account for the non-linearity observed 
between SUE and future returns. In columns four to six we winsorize SUE at 95% and 5% 
percentile levels in a given quarter to account for both the non-linearity mentioned earlier as well to 
eliminate the possibility that extreme SUE values drive our results.  Finally, in columns seven to 
nine we transform SUE into decile ranks to verify that our main result in this paper leads to a 
profitable trading strategy.  We control for Size and BM in all regressions as well as Conglo, Comp, 
and Nseg wherever it is appropriate but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on these firm 
characteristics.   
In column (1) of Table 10, we find that the interaction of SUE with Conglo is virtually 
unchanged in our basic specification when we replace Size and BM adjusted returns with Carhart-
alphas.  Similarly columns (2) and (3) reveal that interactions of SUE with Comp and Nseg, 
respectively, yield very similar results to those observed in Table 3, suggesting that whether we use 
Size and BM adjusted returns or Carhart alphas, we find larger PEAD’s for more complicated firms. 
Similarly winsorizing SUE values at 5% and 95% points every quarter do not change our 
results.  In columns (4) through (6) we find that the interaction of SUE with measures of firm 
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complexity are all positive leading to higher PEADs.  Results in columns (4) through (6) suggest 
that our results are not driven by extreme values of SUE. 
Finally, in columns (7) through (9) we repeat our basic Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions 
using Carhart-alphas and decile values for SUE.  Our conclusions are unchanged as these 
regressions also predict higher PEAD values for firms with more complicated underlying 
businesses. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we hypothesize and document that information about complex firms is harder to 
process, and predict therefore that PEAD is stronger for complex firms.  Using organizational 
structure as our proxy for business complexity, we find that firms with more complicated 
organizational structures (conglomerates) have larger post-earnings announcement drifts compared 
to simpler firms (single-segment firms) for the same level of unexpected earnings surprise (SUE).  
Specifically, we find that conglomerates have post-earnings announcement drifts (PEAD’s) that are 
twice as large as single-segment firms.  The impact of complexity on PEAD lasts for at least two 
months, which leads us to conclude that investors of complex firms have even more trouble 
interpreting earnings-related information than they do interpreting industry-wide shocks (Cohen and 
Lou 2012).  We investigate whether the phenomenon documented in this paper is related to the 
return predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012).  We control for pseudo-conglomerate 
returns in our regressions and find that the interaction between SUE and complexity is unaffected, 
which means that there is virtually no overlap between the Cohen and Lou result and the stronger 
PEADs for conglomerates. 
Our findings can’t be explained by limits-to-arbitrage, in particular by the impact of institutional 
ownership (Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky 2000); arbitrage risk (Mendenhall 2004); 
transactions costs (Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi 2008) or liquidity on PEAD (Sadka 2006) as 
conglomerates on average have larger institutional ownership, have lower idiosyncratic volatility, 
lower bid-ask spreads and higher liquidity compared to single-segment firms.  Rather, we attribute 
our findings to the fact that it is more costly and difficult to understand firm-specific earnings 
information regarding complicated firms and that information processing takes more time for 
complex firms, leading conglomerates to underreact to earnings surprises significantly more than 
single-segment firms.  In order to assess how business complexity impacts information production, 
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we control for size by comparing conglomerates to single-segment firms of similar size.  We 
document that, once we control for firm-size and other fundamental firm characteristics, 
conglomerates have lower institutional ownership, lower short interest, lower segment disclosure 
quality, are covered by fewer analysts, these analysts have less industry expertise and they also 
make larger forecast errors.   
Next, we investigate whether conglomerates release more news for the same level of 
unexpected earnings surprise (SUE) compared to single-segment firms.  Our analysis finds no 
support for this view.  Instead, we find that conglomerates underreact to earnings surprises more 
than single-segment firms as evidenced by larger delayed response ratios for conglomerates 
(42.4%) compared to single-segment firms (31%).  Our analysis lends further support to the 
interpretation that investors have more difficulty processing earnings related information regarding 
conglomerates and that information processing takes more time for complex firms.  
To address the concern that complexity is related to a certain unknown variable that also affects 
the strength of PEAD, we reexamine the effect of complexity on PEAD focusing on periods during 
which firm complexity increases. The analysis provides compelling evidence that supports our 
slower-information-processing hypothesis:  PEAD is stronger for new conglomerates than it is for 
existing conglomerates, and it is also stronger for complicated firms that have recently experienced 
an increase in the number of its segments. We also find that investors are most confused about 
complicated firms that expand from within rather than firms that diversify into new business 
segments via mergers and acquisitions.  We further conduct an investigation of Hirshleifer and 
Teoh’s (2003) assertion that more complicated conglomerates, measured as those with greater 
dispersion in the growth rates of their segment level earnings, face larger mispricing.  We find that 
more complicated conglomerates have larger PEADs than less complicated conglomerates.  Our 
analysis indicates that the degree of complexity influences the level of PEAD and that the cognitive 
cost of processing more complicated segment-level information leads to larger investor inattention 
regarding more complicated conglomerates. 
Our results are robust to controlling for the impact of analyst responsiveness, ex-ante earnings 
volatility, time-varying earnings persistence and disclosure complexity on PEAD.  Not only that, 
but we also document that our results go through when we use Carhart-alphas instead of size and 
book-to-market adjusted returns and that our conclusions are robust to alternative definition of SUE 
such as using SUE values winsorized at .5% (99.5%), 5% (95/5) or simply using SUE deciles.   
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We conclude that business complexity, proxied via organizational structure, has a profound 
effect on how investors process earnings related information.  Our analyses document that investors 
face larger cognitive processing costs regarding conglomerates which leads to larger inattention and 
ultimately larger post-earnings announcement drifts for firms with complicated underlying 
businesses.  
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
The variables are arranged in alphabetical order according to the abbreviated variable name used in 
the tables. 
 
# An (number of analysts; analyst coverage) - the number of analysts covering the firm 
(from IBES detail file). 
Amihud (Amihud illiquidity measure) - the average ratio of absolute return to dollar 
volume, both from CRSP. The ratio is computed daily and averaged within each firm-year (firms 
with less than 200 valid return observations in a year and firms with stock price less than $5 at the 
end of the previous year are excluded) 
CAR(-1;+1) (announcement return) - size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative daily 
returns between the day prior to the earnings announcement and the day after the earnings 
announcement. Earnings announcement dates are from COMPUSTAT, daily returns are from CRSP 
daily files, size and book-to-market adjustment is performed following Daniel et al. (1997) 
CAR(2;60) - size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative daily returns between the second 
day after the earnings announcement and the 60th day after the earnings announcement. 
CAR(2;20) (CAR(21;40), CAR(41;60)) - size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative 
daily returns between the second (21st, 41st) day after the earnings announcement and the 20th 
(40th, 60th) day after the earnings announcement. 
Complexity (firm complexity) - 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl index computed using 
segment sales, 𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 . N is the number of segments (from Compustat segment files, 
segments with the same two-digits SIC code are counted as one segment), si is the fraction of total 
sales generated by segment i. 
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Conglo (conglomerate dummy) - 1 if the firm is a conglomerate, 0 otherwise. The firm is a 
conglomerate if it has business segments in more than one two-digit SIC industry. 
Gibbs (Gibbs measure) - the slope from the regression ΔPt = a + cΔQt, where Pt is the 
stock price and Qt is the trade direction indicator. The values of the Gibbs measure are taken from 
the website of Joel Hasbrouck and are available from January 1964 to December 2009. For more 
details, please refer to Hasbrouck (2009). 
IO (institutional ownership) - the sum of institutional holdings from Thompson Financial 
13F database, divided by the shares outstanding from CRSP. All stocks below the 20th 
NYSE/AMEX size percentile are dropped. If the stock is not dropped, appears on CRSP, but not on 
Thompson Financial 13Fs, it is assumed to have zero institutional ownership. 
IVol (idiosyncratic volatility) - the standard deviation of residuals from the Fama-French 
model, fitted to the daily data for each firm-month (at least 15 valid observations are required). 
NewConglo (new conglomerate dummy) - 1 if the firm became a conglomerate in the past 
two years (the year of the change in the conglomerate status excluded), zero otherwise. Single-
segment firms always have NewConglo=0. 
NSeg (number of segments) - the number of business segments the firm has (from 
Compustat segment files). Segments with the same two-digit SIC code are counted as one segment. 
PCRet (pseudo-conglomerate return) - For each conglomerate firm, a pseudo-
conglomerate consists of a portfolio of the conglomerate firm's segments made up using only stand-
alone firms from the respective industries. For each portfolio that corresponds to a specific segment 
of the conglomerate firm an equal-weighted return is calculated. Returns corresponding to each 
segment are then value weighted according to that segment's contribution to the conglomerate firm's 
total revenues in order calculate a corresponding pseudo conglomerate return. 
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Res # An, Res # Spec (residual number of analyst/specialists) - the number of 
analysts/specialists following the firm orthogonalized to size. The orthogonalization is performed 
by running a cross-sectional regression of the number of analysts/specialists on size in each quarter 
and taking the residuals. 
Roll (Roll measure) - the estimate of effective bid-ask spread, computed as 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑡 = 200 ∙
√𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡, 𝑅𝑡−1)) 
SegInc (segment increase dummy) - 1 if the firm experienced an increase in the number of 
segments in the past two years (the year of the change excluded), zero otherwise. Single-segment 
firms always have SegInc=0. 
# Spec (number of specialists) - the number of analysts covering the firm who are 
specialists in the firm's industry. An analyst is considered a specialist in the firm's industry if he/she 
covers at least five other firms with the same two-digit (# Spec2) or three-digit (# Spec3) SIC code 
in the same quarter. For a conglomerate, an analyst is classified as a specialist based on the industry 
affiliation of the largest segment. 
% Spec (percentage of specialists) - the number of specialists following the firm (# Spec) 
divided by the number of analysts following the firm (# An). 
SUE (earnings surprise) - standardized unexpected earnings, computed as 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−4
𝑃𝑡
 
where Et is the announced earnings per share for the current quarter, Et-4 is the earnings per 
share from the same quarter of the previous year, and Pt is the share price for the current quarter. 
Size (market cap) - shares outstanding times price, both from the CRSP monthly returns 
file. Size is measured in billion dollars. 
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Spread - the spread implied by the daily high and low prices. Spread is calculated by the 
formula from Corwin and Schultz (2012): 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
2∙(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛼−1)
1+ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛼
,     where 
α =  
√𝛽∙(√2−1)
3−2√2
− √
𝛾
3−2√2
,     where 
𝛽 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (
𝐻𝐼𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑡
) +  𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (
𝐻𝐼𝑡+1
𝐿𝑂𝑡+1
)   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛾 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
max (𝐻𝐼𝑡, 𝐻𝐼𝑡+1)
min (𝐿𝑂𝑡, 𝐿𝑂𝑡+1)
) 
where HIt (LOt) is the highest (lowest) price of the stock on day t. 
Turn (turnover) - monthly dollar trading volume over market capitalization at the end of 
the month (both from CRSP), averaged in each firm-year. 
Zero (zero frequency) - the fraction of zero-return days within each firm-year. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Earnings Announcements       
Panel B1. Raw Values   Panel B2. Absolute Values 
  Single Conglo S-C     Single Conglo S-C 
SUE 0.156% 0.155% 0.001%   SUE 0.626% 0.660% -0.03% 
 
(6.86) (4.03) (0.06)   
 (17.40) (17.20) (-1.52) 
EA 0.137% 0.161% -0.024%   EA 3.575% 2.866% 0.71% 
 
(2.80) (3.17) (-0.59)   
 (12.50) (14.40) (5.67) 
# Observations 269,771 111,588     # Observations 269,771 111,588   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Panel A1. SUE and Complexity Distribution - All Firms  
 
 
 
     
    
Percentiles 
     
 
# Observations Mean 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 
SUE                   381,359 0.010 -0.317 -0.145 -0.075 -0.034 -0.007 0.002 0.008 0.029 0.064 0.129 0.302 
Nseg                  549,526 1.547 1 1 1 1 1 1.2 2 2.7 3.4 4 4.7 
Comp                549,526 0.117 0 0 0 0 0 0.023 0.143 0.449 0.546 0.608 0.678 
 
 
            
Panel A2. SUE and Complexity Distribution - Conglomerates Only 
 
 
      
Percentiles 
     
  # Observations Mean 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 
SUE                   111,588 -0.001 -0.271 -0.129 -0.067 -0.031 -0.007 0.002 0.008 0.026 0.053 0.101 0.220 
Nseg                  146,583 2.646 2 2 2 2 2 2.2 3.1 3.8 4.3 4.9 5.7 
Comp                146,583 0.351 0.011 0.021 0.041 0.079 0.191 0.368 0.497 0.596 0.655 0.694 0.736 
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Table 1- continued 
 
Panel C. Liquidity  
  Single Conglo S-C  
Gibbs 0.54 0.389 0.151  
 (13.3) (21.9) (4.61)  
# Observations 244,834 103,904    
Spread 0.871 0.599 0.272  
 
(12.4) (13) (5.2)  
# Observations 313,595 120,893    
Roll 1.525 1.2 0.325  
 
(17.8) (20.9) (4.95)  
# Observations 320,381 122,410    
Amihud 3.686 2.201 1.484  
 
(3.73) (2.94) (4.76)  
# Observations 163,056 73,220    
Zero 14.09 11.81 2.28  
 
(5.64) (5.87) (3.85)  
# Observations 319,289 121,481    
 
Note: This table presents mean (Panels A and B) and median (Panel C) values of numerous firm characteristics for single-segment firms (``Single"), and 
conglomerates (``Conglo") as well as the difference between single-segment firms and conglomerates (S-C). Conglomerates are defined as firms with 
business segments in more than one industry (industries are based on two-digit SIC codes) with corresponding information in Compustat Segment files, 
single-segment firms are all other firms with information in Compustat segment files. Firm (business) complexity, Comp, is 1-HHI, where HHI is the 
Herfindahl index computed using segment sales within a conglomerate: for each segment, we compute the amount of sales generated by that segment as a 
fraction of the total sales of the firm and add up the squared fractions to compute HHI. Nseg is the number of segments the firm has. Segments are counted 
as distinct business units if they can be assigned to different two-digit SIC industries. SUE measures surprise unexpected earnings as (Et-Et-4)/Pt, where Et 
is the announced earnings per share for the current quarter, Et-4 is the earnings per share from the same quarter of the previous year, and P t is the share 
price for the current quarter. EA measures earnings announcement reaction in percentage returns. Detailed explanations of SUE, Nseg, Comp, EA as well 
as firm level liquidity and information environment variables are in the Data Appendix. The differences for different firm characteristics between Single 
and Conglo firms are calculated quarterly and the time-series averages of these differences are reported in the difference columns. The t-statistics use 
Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses in Panels 
B and C. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations. 
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Table 2 
Comparing the Information Production for Conglomerates and Single-segment firms with similar firm characteristics 
 
                    
Panel A. Information Environment of Single-Segment firms and Conglomerates across size deciles 
Panel A1. Single-Segment Firms 
Size Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Big 
# Analysts 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.4 3.0 3.6 4.5 5.7 7.2 11.4 
# Specialists SIC2 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.9 3.7 4.8 6.3 10.4 
# Specialists SIC3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.3 4.3 5.7 9.7 
% of Specialists SIC2 0.604 0.657 0.682 0.702 0.725 0.754 0.771 0.805 0.837 0.896 
% of Specialists SIC3 0.472 0.533 0.564 0.576 0.606 0.633 0.662 0.696 0.736 0.820 
Forecast Dispersion 0.524 0.520 0.406 0.380 0.364 0.269 0.213 0.220 0.158 0.112 
Forecast Error 1.169 1.154 0.909 0.824 0.762 0.662 0.540 0.474 0.384 0.293 
Segment Disclosure Quality 0.366 0.365 0.361 0.359 0.358 0.358 0.349 0.341 0.335 0.339 
IO 0.172 0.207 0.240 0.280 0.329 0.374 0.426 0.462 0.486 0.501 
Turn 4.327 4.998 6.089 7.151 8.191 9.120 10.137 11.011 11.292 10.871 
RSI 0.005 0.010 0.016 0.022 0.029 0.035 0.039 0.038 0.035 0.025 
# Observations 16,344 16,079 15,768 15,180 14,615 14,132 13,351 12,268 11,048 9,579 
           
Panel A2. Conglomerates 
Size Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Big 
# Analysts 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.4 4.3 6.0 10.1 
# Specialists SIC2 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.2 4.7 8.6 
# Specialists SIC3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.7 4.0 7.6 
% of Specialists SIC2 0.508 0.482 0.542 0.561 0.580 0.628 0.637 0.696 0.740 0.819 
% of Specialists SIC3 0.367 0.377 0.402 0.420 0.415 0.463 0.498 0.570 0.608 0.711 
Forecast Dispersion 0.507 0.435 0.459 0.389 0.388 0.409 0.250 0.250 0.207 0.133 
Forecast Error 1.257 1.087 1.152 0.958 0.848 0.717 0.704 0.534 0.471 0.341 
Segment Disclosure Quality 0.200 0.198 0.196 0.197 0.195 0.196 0.199 0.203 0.203 0.203 
IO 0.170 0.206 0.234 0.277 0.340 0.394 0.438 0.455 0.475 0.495 
Turn 4.184 4.453 5.259 6.451 7.273 8.064 8.569 9.000 9.054 8.556 
RSI 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.022 0.028 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.025 0.018 
# Observations 2,792 3,115 3,437 4,009 4,570 5,083 5,849 6,926 8,157 9,573 
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Table 2 - continued 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C. Information Environment of Single-Segment firms and Conglomerates: Regression Analyses 
              
log(1 + # Analysts) 
 
Forecast Error 
 
IO 
 
Turn 
 
RSI 
  1 
 
  2 
 
  3 
 
  4 
 
  5 
Intercept 0.132 
 
Intercept 0.555 
 
Intercept 9.809 
 
Intercept -3.819 
 
Intercept 1.313 
 
(4.07) 
  
(9.03) 
 
 (3.13) 
  
(-3.40) 
  
(3.20) 
Conglo -0.124 
 
Conglo 0.056 
 
Conglo -3.337 
 
Conglo -1.824 
 
Conglo -0.387 
 
(-12.96) 
  
(3.01) 
  
(-3.79) 
  
(-5.57) 
  
(-3.14) 
Size 0.264 
 
Size -0.078 
 
Age -0.050 
 
Age 0.011 
 
Beta 0.022 
 
(71.27) 
  
(-12.81) 
  
(-3.06) 
  
(2.13) 
  
(8.57) 
Nasdaq 0.077 
 
Rdsales -0.022 
 
Div 0.233 
 
Beta 0.039 
 
IO 0.036 
 
(6.84) 
  
(-5.56) 
  
(6.34) 
  
(11.76) 
  
(7.03) 
BM -0.243 
 
Lev 0.490 
 
Size 0.071 
 
MB 0.050 
 
Rett-1 -0.001 
 
(-24.45) 
  
(9.77) 
  
(2.08) 
  
(8.77) 
  
(-0.68) 
Beta 0.069 
 
Intan -0.166 
 
Mom1 0.019 
 
Size 0.064 
 
MB 0.030 
 
Panel B. Information Environment of Single-Segment firms and Conglomerates: The Role of Size Matching 
           
Panel B1. No Matching 
 
Panel B2. Size Matching 
  Conglo Single diff t-stat 
 
  Conglo Single diff t-stat 
# Analysts 5.4 4.7 0.7 (5.28) 
 
# Analysts 5.4 6.6 -1.2 (-7.53) 
# Specialists (SIC2) 4.3 4.0 0.3 (2.41) 
 
# Specialists (SIC2) 4.3 5.8 -1.5 (-10.01) 
# Specialists (SIC3) 3.6 3.6 0.1 (0.74) 
 
# Specialists (SIC3) 3.6 5.2 -1.6 (-11.06) 
% of Specialists (SIC2) 0.70 0.77 -0.07 (-12.63) 
 
% of Specialists (SIC2) 0.70 0.81 -0.12 (-12.42) 
% of Specialists (SIC3) 0.57 0.66 -0.09 (-14.45) 
 
% of Specialists (SIC3) 0.57 0.71 -0.15 (-14.46) 
Forecast Dispersion 0.24 0.25 -0.01 (-1.10)  Forecast Dispersion 0.24 0.18 0.06 (3.24) 
Forecast Error 0.59 0.63 -0.04 (-1.88) 
 
Forecast Error 0.59 0.50 0.09 (3.29) 
Segment Disclosure Quality 0.20 0.35 -0.15 (-3.60)  Segment Disclosure Quality 0.20 0.35 -0.15 (-3.54) 
IO 0.41 0.37 0.04 (12.65)  IO 0.41 0.41 0.00 (0.40) 
Turn 7.44 8.04 -0.60 (-2.29)  Turn 7.44 8.87 -1.43 (-3.99) 
RSI 0.02 0.02 -0.00 (-6.14)  RSI 0.02 0.03 -0.00 (-9.02) 
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Table 2 - continued 
 
t-stat (12.56) 
  
(-2.63) 
  
(2.40) 
  
(5.13) 
  
(11.42) 
1/P -0.088 
 
Vol 1.614 
 
Mom4 -0.026 
 
Mlev 0.009 
 
Size -0.037 
t-stat (-4.88) 
  
(10.13) 
  
(-3.08) 
  
(1.43) 
  
(-5.03) 
Vol -0.817 
    
Prc 0.316 
 
# Analysts 0.085 
 
Mom -0.010 
t-stat (-10.06) 
     
(13.10) 
  
(6.97) 
  
(-5.64) 
Ret -0.006 
    
Snp 0.664 
 
Prc -0.030 
 
Prc 0.006 
t-stat (-1.76) 
     
(0.45) 
  
(-3.00) 
  
(1.39) 
Rett-1 0.018        
Retn -0.026 
   
t-stat (5.72) 
        
(-4.22) 
   
Turn 0.109 
       
Retp 0.053 
   
t-stat (32.56)               
 
(3.35)       
 
 
Note: Panel A of this table compares analyst coverage and segment disclosure quality of single-segment firms and conglomerates in ten size decile groups 
where the same size break-points are used for both single-segment firms and conglomerates. Panel A.1 reports analyst coverage and segment disclosure 
quality statistics for single-segment firms while Panel A.2 reports these statistics for conglomerates. # Analysts measures the total number of analysts 
covering a firm. # Specialists SIC2 (# Specialists SIC3) reports the number of analysts that cover five or more firms in the same industry where industry is 
defined using the two-digit (three-digit) SIC code. For conglomerates, specialists are defined based on the industry affiliation of the firm's main segment. % 
of Specialists SIC2 (% of Specialists SIC3) reports the percentage of analysts that cover the firm who are specialists using the two-digit (three-digit) SIC 
code. Forecast Dispersion is the standard deviation of all earnings per share (EPS) forecasts, scaled by the absolute value of mean EPS forecasts. Forecast 
Error is the absolute value of the difference between consensus earnings forecast and actual earnings, scaled by actual earnings. Segment Disclosure Quality 
is the firm’s average industry-adjusted (at 2-digit SIC code levels) percentage of segment items reported at the end of the fiscal year and is calculated as 
described in Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Debt: The Role of Segment Disclosures by Franco, Urcan and Vasvari (2015). RSI is relative short 
interest measured by outstanding short position divided by the number of shares outstanding. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated 
as # Observations. Panel B summarizes analyst coverage statistics for single-segment firms and conglomerates while also reporting the differences for the 
two groups. Panel B.1 reports differences between conglomerates and size-matched single segment firms, while Panel B.2 reports differences without any 
size-matching. Conglo refers to conglomerates, while Single refers to single-segment firms. We report the differences between the two groups using diff, 
while t-statistics are reported below in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1984 to December 2010. The sample excludes firms 
with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile.  Panel C repeats the analyses in Panels A and B in a regression setting where we control for firm 
characteristics other than size deemed important by the extant literature in the determination of analyst coverage, institutional ownership, relative short 
interest as well as turnover.  Nasdaq is a Nasdaq dummy variable. Beta is the CAPM market beta in the past 60 months. 1/P is one divided by the year-end 
stock price. Vol is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. Ret is the annual stock return of the current year, and Rett-1 measures the 
annual stock return of the previous year. Rdsales is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Lev is the book leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total 
assets. Intan is the log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Age is the firm age. Div is the dividend payout ratio. Mom1 is the cumulative 
return in the past three months, and Mom4 is the cumulative return between month -4 and month -12. Prc is the stock price. Snp is the membership in the 
S&P500 index dummy variable. MB is the market-to-book ratio. Mlev is the market leverage. Retp (Retn) is the positive (negative) return in the previous 
quarter which equals to the return if it is positive (negative), zero otherwise. Mom is the cumulative return between month -2 and month -12. 
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Table 3 
Impact of Firm Complexity on Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
                
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SUE 0.118 0.095 0.127 0.099 0.127 0.051 0.078 
 
(4.98) (4.17) (3.37) (4.36) (3.34) (1.63) (1.79) 
SUE*BM 
  
-0.027 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.025 
   
(-1.27) 
 
(-0.94) 
 
(-1.19) 
SUE*Size 
  
-0.013 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.014 
   
(-0.98) 
 
(-1.02) 
 
(-1.16) 
SUE*Conglo 
 
0.084 0.105 
    
  
(2.61) (3.32) 
    SUE*Comp 
   
0.184 0.217 
  
    
(2.73) (3.45) 
  SUE*Nseg 
     
0.048 0.054 
      
(2.56) (2.88) 
# Observations 248,261 248,261 248,261 248,261 248,261 248,261 248,261 
 
Note: This table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted 
cumulative returns in the 60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) 
on earnings surprise, SUE, and its interaction with measures of firm (business) complexity. Conglo is the 
conglomerate dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. Conglomerates are defined 
as firms with more than one business segment. Firm complexity, Comp, is 1-HHI, where HHI is the 
Herfindahl index computed using segment sales within a conglomerate: for each segment, we compute the 
amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales of the firm and add up the 
squared fractions to compute HHI. Nseg is the number of segments the firm has. Segments are counted as 
distinct business units if they can be assigned to different two-digit SIC industries. Definitions of size 
(Size) and book-to-market ratio (BM) are in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) 
correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each coefficient in Italic font 
and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes 
firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the 
analyses is abbreviated as # Observations. For brevity coefficients on BM, Size, Conglo, Comp and Nseg 
are not reported in this table although we control for BM and Size in all regressions and we control for 
Conglo, Comp and Nseg wherever it is relevant. 
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Table 4 
Delayed Response Reaction for Single-segment Firms versus Conglomerates 
        
Panel A. PEAD in Extreme Deciles 
   
   CAR(-1;1) CAR(2;60) 
SUETop  0.033 0.011 
 
 (26.51) (3.19) 
SUETop*BM  0.002 0.008 
 
 (2.06) (2.62) 
SUETop*Size  -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (-5.52) (-1.75) 
SUETop*Conglo  0.000 0.008 
 
 (0.23) (1.89) 
# Observations  49,542 49,542 
    
    
Panel B. Delayed Response Ratio 
   
   Single Conglo Diff 
Delayed Response Ratio 0.310 0.424 0.114 
 
(8.90) (12.22) (2.33) 
# Observations 49,542 49,542  
 
Note: Panel A of this table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted 
cumulative returns in the three days around earnings announcements, CAR(-1;+1) and in the post-
announcement window, CAR(+2;+60), on the top decile dummy (SUETop) and on its interaction with the 
conglomerate dummy (Conglo) as well as with size, and book-to-market. In Panel A, we also control for 
Conglo, Size, and BM but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on these firm characteristics. SUETop is 
1 for the top SUE decile and 0 for the bottom SUE decile and helps capture hedge returns to going long on the 
highest SUE decile and going short on the lowest SUE decile (all other firms are dropped from the sample). The 
t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below 
each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. Panel B uses the results in Panel A to estimate what fraction of 
information in earnings announcement is incorporated into the prices outside of the earnings announcement 
window. Specifically we calculate the ratio of the drift return, CAR(+2,+60), to the total earnings reaction 
return, CAR(-1,+60), to measure the delayed response ratio for single-segment firms and conglomerates, 
respectively, and calculate the difference in the delayed response for these two groups of firms for extreme 
positive (negative) surprise earnings deciles. Conglo is the conglomerate dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a 
conglomerate and 0 otherwise. Conglomerates are defined as firms with more than one business segment. The 
z-statistics are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from 
January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size 
quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations.  
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Table 5 
How Long Does Firm Complexity Impact PEAD? 
 
          
Panel A. Conglomerate Dummy 
  CAR(2;60) CAR(2;20) CAR(21;40) CAR(41;60) 
SUE 0.127 0.041 0.049 0.041 
 
(3.37) (2.34) (2.97) (1.92) 
SUE*BM -0.027 -0.014 0.002 -0.016 
 
(-1.27) (-1.00) (0.17) (-1.08) 
SUE*Size -0.013 0.000 -0.006 -0.008 
 
(-0.98) (0.00) (-0.84) (-0.86) 
SUE*Conglo 0.105 0.035 0.046 0.024 
 
(3.32) (2.06) (2.25) (1.11) 
# Observations 248,261 248,258 248,170 244,050 
     Panel B. Complexity 
  CAR(2;60) CAR(2;20) CAR(21;40) CAR(41;60) 
SUE 0.127 0.039 0.048 0.043 
 
(3.34) (2.32) (2.96) (1.89) 
SUE*BM -0.019 -0.011 0.004 -0.014 
 
(-0.94) (-0.79) (0.35) (-0.96) 
SUE*Size -0.013 0.000 -0.006 -0.009 
 
(-1.02) (0.07) (-0.77) (-1.00) 
SUE*Comp 0.217 0.064 0.119 0.032 
 
(3.45) (1.50) (2.74) (0.67) 
# Observations 248,261 248,258 248,170 244,050 
     Panel C. Number of Segments 
  CAR(2;60) CAR(2;20) CAR(21;40) CAR(41;60) 
SUE 0.078 0.013 0.035 0.034 
 
(1.79) (0.75) (1.70) (1.18) 
SUE*BM -0.025 -0.015 0.003 -0.014 
 
(-1.19) (-1.07) (0.27) (-0.96) 
SUE*Size -0.014 -0.001 -0.006 -0.008 
 
(-1.16) (-0.19) (-0.82) (-0.89) 
SUE*Nseg 0.054 0.025 0.019 0.010 
 
(2.88) (3.19) (1.86) (0.83) 
# Observations 248,261 248,258 248,170 244,050 
 
Note: This table presents results of regressions of CAR on SUE, alternative measures of firm (business) complexity, and 
the interactions of SUE with various complexity measures (Conglo, Comp, Nseg). CAR(N;M) is size and book-to-
market adjusted cumulative daily return between the Nth and Mth trading days after each earnings announcement. 
Complexity variables are described in the header of Table 2 and in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West 
(1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in 
parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes firms with market caps in 
the lowest NYSE/AMEX quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations. 
We also control for Conglo, Comp, Nseg, Size, and BM themselves but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on 
these firm characteristics. 
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Table 6 
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift and Changes in Firm Complexity 
                  
Panel A. PEAD and New Conglomerates 
 
Panel B. PEAD and New Segments 
         
  1 2 3 
 
  1 2 3 
SUE 0.085 0.086 0.087 
 
SUE 0.034 0.033 0.045 
 
(3.19) (3.27) (3.26) 
  
(0.89) (0.88) (1.28) 
SUE*BM -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 
 
SUE*BM -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 
(-0.42) (-0.51) (-0.60) 
  
(-0.47) (-0.53) (-0.47) 
SUE*Size -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 
 
SUE*Size -0.018 -0.022 -0.019 
 
(-1.57) (-1.71) (-1.61) 
  
(-1.80) (-2.06) (-1.76) 
Conglo -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
NSeg 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.78) 
  
(-0.27) (-0.48) (-0.31) 
NewConglo -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
 
SegInc -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 
 
(-1.73) (-0.84) (-1.29) 
  
(-1.70) (-0.53) (-2.22) 
SUE*Conglo 0.106 0.119 0.094 
 
SUE*NSeg 0.057 0.061 0.047 
 
(3.00) (3.41) (2.90) 
  
(2.57) (2.83) (2.42) 
SUE*New 0.143 
   
SUE*SegInc 0.063 
  
 
(1.85) 
  
  (1.16) 
  
SUE*M&A 
 
0.046 
  
SUE*M&A 
 
0.046 
 
  
(0.41) 
  
 
 
(0.76) 
 
SUE*NoM&A 
  
0.601 
 
SUE*NoM&A 
  
0.199 
 
    (1.85)       (1.73) 
# Observations 236,979 236,979 236,979   236,979 236,979 236,979 
 
Note: This table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative returns in the 
60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), interaction of 
SUE with alternative measures of firm complexity (Conglo and NSeg), as well as the interaction of SUE with a dummy 
variable for newly created conglomerates (NewConglo, Panel A) or a dummy variable for increase in the number of segments 
(SegInc). NewConglo (SegInc) is one for two years after a firm reports an increase in the number of segments and zero 
otherwise. Both NewConglo and SegInc are set to zero for all single-segment firms. SUE*M&A (SUE*NoM&A) is the 
interaction of SUE with NewConglo / SegInc for segment increases that can be attributed to diversifying M&A activity (that 
cannot be attributed to diversifying M&A activity). Definitions for all other firm characteristics are in the Data Appendix. 
The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each 
coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010.  The sample 
excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses 
is abbreviated as # Observations. We control for Size and BM in all regressions as well as M&A and NoM&A dummies 
wherever it is relevant, but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on these firm characteristics. 
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Table 7 
 
Impact of Dispersion in Segment Growth Rates on Post Earnings Announcement Drift  
        
Conglomerates Only Sample 
    
  1 2 
 
SUE 0.146 0.141 
 
 
(2.50) (2.35) 
 
SUE*BM -0.019 -0.014 
 
 
(-0.34) (-0.26) 
 
SUE*Size -0.000 -0.000 
 
 
(-0.70) (-0.75) 
 
SUE*HTSD 0.200  
 
 (1.89)  
 
SUE*LogHTSD  0.304  
  (2.12)  
# Observations 64,405 64,405  
 
 
Note: This table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative returns in 
the 60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise, SUE, and its 
interaction with HTSD, a theoretical construct proposed by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), which captures the level of 
dispersion in segment growth rates with respect to the aggregate growth rate of the firm. HTSD is the Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003) segment growth dispersion measure computed using segment sales and growth rates within a conglomerate: for 
each segment, we compute the deviation of its growth rate from the firm’s aggregate growth rate and square it, we then 
value weight all segment deviation squared values by the amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the 
total sales of the firm and add up all the squared segment deviation values weighed by corresponding sales share values to 
calculate HTSD.  LogHTSD is the natural logarithm of one plus HTSD.  Segments are counted as distinct business units if 
they can be assigned to different two-digit SIC industries. Definitions of size (Size) and book-to-market ratio (BM) are in 
the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are 
reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1978 to December 
2011. The one-year lag in the sample is necessary in order to calculate segment and firm growth rates. The sample excludes 
firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is 
abbreviated as # Observations. For brevity coefficients on BM, Size, HTSD and LogHTSD are not reported in this table 
although we control for BM and Size in all regressions and we control for HTSD and LogHTSD wherever it is relevant.   
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Table 8 
Robustness: Controlling for Potential Spillover from Industry-wide Information Events on PEAD 
 
          
  1 2 3 4 
SUE 0.106 0.088 0.087 0.040 
 
(3.86) (3.18) (3.18) (1.07) 
PCRet 0.056 0.058 0.055 0.055 
 
(1.89) (1.95) (1.86) (1.84) 
PCRet*Conglo  0.003 -0.012 -0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.13) (-0.52) (-0.05) (-0.13) 
SUE*BM -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.008 
 
(-0.02) (-0.41) (-0.05) (-0.37) 
SUE*Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-1.19) (-1.69) (-1.80) (-1.89) 
SUE*Conglo 
 
0.103 
  
  
(3.24) 
  
SUE*Comp 
  
0.214 
 
   
(3.35) 
 
SUE*Nseg 
   
0.054 
 
      (2.77) 
# Observations 233,298 233,298 233,298 233,298 
 
Note: This table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative returns in 
the 60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), 
interaction of SUE with Conglo (Comp / Nseg), interaction of SUE with the recurring control variables, as well as 
Conglo (Comp / Nseg) and the usual control variables themselves (the latter slopes are not tabulated). Furthermore, we 
also control for the impact of industry-wide information events, estimated via pseudo-conglomerate returns (PCRet), in 
all columns. PCRet is calculated one month before the earnings announcement. To compute PCRet, we first compute 
equal-weighted returns to all single-segment firms in an industry (industries are defined based on the two-digit SIC 
codes). For a single-segment firm, PCRet is calculated as the return to other single-segment firms in its two-digit SIC 
industry. For conglomerates, industry returns for affiliated segments are weighed by the respective sales shares of the 
business segments and the weighted average is referred to as PCRet. Complexity variables are described in the header of 
Table 2 and in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation and are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from 
January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX quintile. The 
number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations. We control for Size and BM in all 
regressions as well as Conglo, Comp and Nseg wherever it is relevant but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on 
these firm characteristics. 
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Table 9 
Robustness: Controlling for Alternative Explanations of PEAD 
                      
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
SUE 0.127 0.142 0.085 0.051 0.806 0.066 0.173 0.135 0.174 1.050 
 
(3.37) (3.10) (2.03) (1.54) (2.24) (0.60) (1.32) (2.96) (3.38) (1.28) 
SUE*BM -0.027 -0.045 -0.053 0.002 -0.006 0.044 0.065 -0.033 -0.029 0.222 
 
(-1.27) (-1.84) (-2.25) (0.09) (-0.19) (0.38) (0.55) (-1.34) (-1.27) (1.02) 
SUE*Size -0.013 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.98) (-0.86) (-0.94) (-0.4) (-0.26) (-2.08) (-2.19) (-0.19) (0.11) (0.00) 
SUE*Conglo 0.105 0.083 0.087 0.127 0.127 0.211 0.209 0.108 0.097 0.332 
 
(3.32) (2.48) (2.65) (2.01) (2.05) (2.50) (2.44) (2.91) (2.54) (3.12) 
SUE*EP 
  
0.252 
      
-0.068 
   
(2.87) 
      
(-0.20) 
SUE*FOG 
    
-0.038 
    
-0.053 
     
(-2.08) 
    
(-1.32) 
SUE*DRESP 
      
-0.276 
  
-0.160 
       
(-1.06) 
  
(-1.51) 
SUE*EarnVol 
        
-0.068 -0.034 
 
                (-2.16) (-0.31) 
# Observations 248,261 181,023 181,023 113,100 113,100 84,970 84,970 229,174 229,174 49,513 
 
Note: This table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative returns in the 60 trading 
days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), interaction of SUE with the conglomerate 
dummy and interaction of SUE with control variables, as well as the conglomerate dummy and the control variables themselves (the latter 
slopes are not tabulated). The control variables include size, book-to-market (BM), time-varying earnings persistence (EP) a la Chen (2013), 
textual complexity (FOG) a la Li (2008), analyst responsiveness (DRESP), and earnings volatility (EarnVol). Detailed definitions of all 
control variables are in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and 
are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The 
sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is 
abbreviated as # Observations. We control for Size and BM in all regressions as well as Conglo, EP, FOG, DRESP and EarnVol wherever it 
is appropriate but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on these firm characteristics. 
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Table 10 
Robustness: Accounting for Non-Linearity in SUE and Using Alternative CAR Measures in PEAD Regressions 
                        
 
Carhart Alphas 
 
Winsorized SUE 
 
SUE as Decile Rank 
  1 2 3 
 
4 5 6 
 
7 8 9 
SUE 0.137 0.135 0.085 
 
0.467 0.465 0.375 
 
0.086 0.085 0.082 
 
(3.24) (3.38) (1.85) 
 
(4.27) (4.41) (3.10) 
 
(9.56) (9.39) (9.06) 
SUE*BM -0.048 -0.042 -0.048 
 
0.027 0.041 0.033 
 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(-2.05) (-1.84) (-2.05) 
 
(0.34) (0.51) (0.41) 
 
(-1.45) (-1.27) (-1.42) 
SUE*Size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(-1.65) (-1.71) (-1.88) 
 
(-3.12) (-3.05) (-3.36) 
 
(-7.51) (-7.41) (-7.57) 
SUE*Conglo 0.099 
   
0.171 
   
0.006 
  
 
(3.12) 
   
(2.68) 
   
(1.79) 
  
SUE*Comp 
 
0.229 
   
0.399 
   
0.016 
 
  
(3.41) 
   
(2.70) 
   
(2.06) 
 
SUE*Nseg 
  
0.055 
   
0.094 
   
0.004 
 
    (3.12)       (3.02)       (2.50) 
# Observations 248,261 248,261 248,261  248,261 248,261 248,261  248,261 248,261 248,261 
 
Note: This table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of firm-specific Carhart alphas in the 60 trading days (one-quarter) 
following earnings announcements αC(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), interactions of SUE with the measures of firm complexity 
(Conglo, Comp and Nseg) and with standard controls (Size and BM). Columns one to three use the baseline definition of SUE 
(winsorized at 99.5% and 0.5% percentile), columns four to six winsorize SUE at 95% and 5% percentile, columns seven to nine 
transform SUE into decile ranks. Detailed definitions of all variables are in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West 
(1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. 
The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX 
size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations. We control for Size and BM in all 
regressions as well as Conglo, Comp, and Nseg wherever it is appropriate but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on these 
firm characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
